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Chapter 1: Acknowledgements and Publications 
 
 
1.1 Acknowledgements 
 
 
  A scholar is only as good as the giants on which she stands. Many scholars have helped 
with broad shoulders and robust input for this book. I am forever indebted to Dr. David 
Audretsch, mentor, friend, and partner at the Max Planck Institute of Economics, for his six 
years of guidance dating back to the olden days during my Master’s of Public Affairs at Indiana 
University. His profound insights in the field of entrepreneurship helped catapult a student, at 
that time, attending Indiana University interested in nonprofit management into a Ph.D. 
candidate with a passion for academic entrepreneurship. His generosity and reward for hard work 
and getting the job done all substantially improved this book. Alexander Oettl, friend, mentor 
and, at times, guide to the wacky world of business management literature, offered daily support 
at the University of Toronto. Alex, partially because of time zone differences was always there 
for me late at night. I still owe him several beers for his patience and dedication to substantially 
improving this book.  
  Lesa Mitchell at the Marion Ewing Kauffman foundation, who is also a guiding light in 
the field of academic entrepreneurship, provided kind and generous help. I doubt very much that 
my work would be nearly as rich without her contributions. Dr. Anders Hoffman at FORA, in 
Copenhagen, deserves significant credit for his continued support in connecting radical 
innovation to entrepreneurship. The Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy division at the 
Max Planck Institute of Economics must be generously cited for their daily support and 
contributions to all my work. Another important scholar, while not contributing directly to this 
book is Dr. Rajaram Krishnan. Without his inspirational teaching at Earlham College I would 
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have never studied Economics as an undergraduate. He is a friend and mentor who showed me 
that most questions in life could be answered in economic terms; if one was brave enough to ask 
honest questions and, more importantly, to accept honest answers.  
  Other notable contributors through scholarship or research support are: Dr. Chad Jackson 
at Emory University, Dr. Till Heine at the Free University of Berlin, Dr. Tamer Mahmoud at 
American University/White & Case LLP, Sandy Miller at Stanford University, Dr. Farid 
Moustafi at the Medical School of Toledo, and Betty Fiscus, my North Star, at Indiana 
University for always making sure I dotted my “i”s and crossed my “t”s.  
  I would also like to humbly thank my Ph.D. committee for their time and help with my 
book, notably, Dr. Erik Lehman, at the University of Augsburg. 
  Finally, I would like to thank my family: Melanie Fabich, beautiful Lilly Aldridge and 
Athena Aldridge, my mother Susan Aldridge, step father Dr. Erhard Schellman, and my 
Grandmother Millicent Taylor. 
 
1.2 Publications 
 
  This book draws heavily from papers that have been published or which are forthcoming. 
Chapter three draws heavily from a paper published in an edited book volume with Cambridge 
Press, an accepted forthcoming paper to be published in Research Policy, and a paper to be 
submitted to Nature. Chapter four is currently in the process of improvement with the ambition 
of being submitted to Management Science by the end of 2009. Chapter five, draws on an 
accepted forthcoming publication in Annals of Regional Science. Chapter six draws on an 
accepted forthcoming publication in International Small Business Journal.  
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  The content of these chapters has also been featured, among others, in Nature “U.S. 
Cancer Funding Creates Business as Well as Science”, New York Times “U.S. Research Funds 
Often Lead to Startups”, and Max Planck Forschung “Geschäftsideen aus dem Labor” 
 
Chapter 2: Introduction and Overview 
2.1 Introduction  
It is often said that Silicon Valley is the cradle of Biotechnology. If however, the Bay 
Area is the cradle, then the parents of such high growth and innovation can only be academic 
scientists. Indeed, academic entrepreneurship in the United States has provided incredible 
amounts of highly innovative and successful enterprises. While Silicon Valley may be the most 
dazzling example of successful scientist entrepreneurship, many other regions and universities 
have also had highly academic entrepreneurship. Some of these examples are: Genentech, 
Google, Gatorade, Digital, Medtronic, Amgen, Biogen and Cellomics. In fact, over 50 scientist 
founded companies have graced the Fortune 500 club.   Yet, as regions and policy makers turn to 
find new ways of growth and innovation, the notion of individual scientist entrepreneurs as 
pistons of economic growth, have never truly been entered into either the policy discussions or 
into economic literature. 
These discussions have remained relatively obscure and enigmatic for several reasons. 
First, there is a clear lack of systematic data. Following scientist startups are incredibly costly for 
third parties. Part of the problem why there is little understanding of scientist startups is largely 
associated on a reliance on Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs). While the TTOs serve as the 
commercial mechanism for university knowledge to transform into commercial success, there is 
an underlying problem in their mission. These TTOs serves as financial arms for the university to 
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maximize licensing income, while substituting optimal commercialization whether through 
scientist entrepreneurship or other means.  
The second problem is the TTOs are viewed as the primary meausre of university 
commercialization. Currently, the United States issues 40 billion dollars a year in federal grants, 
roughly 30 percent of total research and development (R&D) dollars spent in the United States 
per year. This public investment has left scholars and policy makers asking the question of what 
the rate of return is on this investment. Indeed, the rate is somewhere around 2.5% per year on 
public R&D. Yet, given this incredible investment, how can one justify such a low rate of return? 
The devil is in the details. By using almost exclusively TTO data, scientist startups, if indeed 
occurring, go unreported and therefore not included in the rate of return.  
The third important problem relates to how academic knowledge spillovers into a 
mechanism for commercialization. Economic literature has relied heavily on the Solow and 
Romer growth models. These models have suggested that where there are high investments in 
knowledge, there will be higher rates of growth. But understanding exactly how these knowledge 
investments manifests themselves into growth have remained largely unclear for policy makers. 
Specifically, while knowledge generation is incredibly important, the path from knowledge 
creation to economic growth is not entirely clear. Many countries for example, have turned to 
high investments in knowledge but have had little success actually transforming knowledge into 
economic growth. This book will help to demonstrate that one path for knowledge to directly 
transform itself into growth are academic scientist startups. These startups inject high quality 
knowledge into the market and led to high economic growth.  
 
2.2 Contribution to the Literature 
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There are three key areas of contribution. The first subject is quantifying and following 
scientist startup activity. As mentioned above, traditional mechanisms of measurement have 
relied on TTO data. This book offers an insight into scientist startup data using a unique dataset 
of scientist startups from 1998 to 2004. The contribution helps explain that there is indeed, much 
more commercialization occurring than previously thought. Secondly, it explains the route of 
commercialization. These routes are defined by whether a scientist startups up a company with 
TTO permission, whether the scientist startups a company that is not registered with the TTO 
and finally, licensing the technology through to TTO.  
The second contribution is demonstrating that the only significant variables for scientists 
starting up are how heterogeneous her knowledge stock may be. Classifying the scientists 
registered patents using their forward and backward patent citations, the book offers a first look 
into how scientist startups actually occur. The book offers a clear suggestion that startups occur 
when a scientist has either a patent which has either a broad set of patent citations or a very 
narrow set of patent citations. The degree to which these patent citations are measured is used by 
applying Generality and Originality Herfindahl index. 
The third contribution to the literature is demonstrating that there is indeed a substitution 
affect between starting up and licensing a patent. There is an open question as to what sort of 
commercialization occurs when scientist have a knowledge stock. The book will show that 
substation affects between starting up a company and licensing. This finding may have important 
affects for optimizing growth for the university, region and country.  
2.3 Overview 
The book will offer four scholarly chapters. Chapter three will offer several contributions. 
The chapter will first review the Romer and Solow model of economic growth and then offer the 
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Audretsch’s “Knowledge Spillover of Economic Growth.” The chapter will then proceed to offer 
a dataset which can qualitatively address the knowledge spillover of growth by using scientist 
data. The chapter then explains why academic commercialization may not be fully reported as 
previously thought. The chapter has offers three important conclusions. First the chapter finds 
that over 25 percent of scientists startup, second that there is a substitution affect between 
starting up and licensing, third that scientist have started up off of patents which are not 
registered with the TTO.  
Chapter four offers a theoretical and empirical model as to why scientists startup firms. 
Controlling for a broad lists of usual suspects variables, the chapter attempts to categorize the 
scientist’s knowledge stock. The chapter applies the Henderson et al (1998) model of patent 
classification. The model categorizes the knowledge stock of a patent in two ways. First it uses 
the patent’s backward citation. These citations are where the patent cites its previous knowledge 
stock of off which it is built. This measure is defined by how Original the patent may be. For 
example, the patent may have very few backward citations drawing from different patent 
classification fields. The patent would therefore have a high originality score. The second 
measure is how often a patent is cited from future patents. If, for example, a patent is heavily 
cited from future issued patents, it would have a high Generality score. The paper then applies 
this metric to show that the only significant variables for starting a company are how 
heterogeneous her knowledge stock may be.  
Chapter five explains geographic knowledge generation in scientists. Using the theory of 
knowledge spillover, the chapter explains how and where scientists generate their knowledge 
stock. The paper categorizes knowledge creation through where the scientist generates patents 
and what variables are important for a region to generate knowledge. The chapter finds that 
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several key variables are important for generating a high quality knowledge stock in a region. 
This knowledge stock for regions therefore becomes quite important to manifest itself into 
economic growth.  
Chapter six taxonomizes the radical and incremental innovation literature. This paper 
offers a broad lens of understanding where the literature is with radical and incremental 
innovation. There is a broad understanding how radical and incremental literature has developed 
in scholarship. The chapter then attempts of find an ex ante approach to identifying radical 
innovation in patents. The conclusion finds the Dahlin Behrens method of identifying radical 
innovative patents may be the best method for scholars trying to identify radical innovations ex 
ante.   
 
Chapter 3: The Knowledge Filter and Routes of Scientist Commercialization  
3.1 Introduction 
The enormous investment in physical plant and equipment propelled the United 
States to unprecedented post World War II prosperity. In the new era of globalization, both 
scholars and policy makers have been looking towards the country’s unrivaled investment 
in research and knowledge to generate economic growth, employment and competitiveness 
in internationally linked markets for continued prosperity. However, it has been long 
recognized that investment in scientific knowledge and research alone will not 
automatically generate growth and prosperity. Rather, these new knowledge investments 
must penete what Audretsch et al. (2006) Acs and Armington (2006) and Acs et al. (2004) 
term “the knowledge filter” in order to contribute to innovation, competitiveness and 
ultimately economic growth. In fact, the knowledge filter impeding the commercialization 
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of investments in research and knowledge can be formidable. As Senator Birch Bayh 
warned, “A wealth of scientific talent at American colleges and universities — talent 
responsible for the development of numerous innovative scientific breakthroughs each year 
— is going to waste as a result of bureaucratic red tape and illogical government 
regulations…”1 It is the knowledge filter that stands between investment in research on the 
one hand, and its commercialization through innovation, leading ultimately to economic 
growth, on the other. 
Seen through the eyes of Senator Bayh, the magnitude of the knowledge filter is 
daunting, “What sense does it make to spend billions of dollars each year on government-
supported research and then prevent new developments from benefiting the American 
people because of dumb bureaucratic red tape?”2 
In an effort to penetrate such a formidable knowledge filter, the Congress enacted 
the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 to spur the transfer of technology from university research to 
commercialization.3 The goal of the Bayh-Dole Act was to facilitate the commercialization 
of university science. Assessments about the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on penetrating 
the knowledge filter and facilitating the commercialization of university research have 
bordered on the euphoric:4  
                                                 
1 Introductory statement of Birch Bayh, September 13, 1978, cited from the Association of University 
Technology Managers Report (AUTM ) (2004, p. 5). 
2 Statement by Birch Bayh, April 13, 1980, on the approval of S. 414 (Bayh-Dole) by the U.S. Senate on a 
91-4 vote, cited from (AUTM) (2004, p. 16). 
3 Public Law 98-620 
4 Mowery (2005, p. 40-41) argues that such a positive assessment of the impact on Bayh-Dole is 
exaggerated, “Although it seems clear that the criticism of high-technology startups that was widespread 
during the period of pessimism over U.S. competitiveness was overstated, the recent focus on patenting and 
licensing as the essential ingredient in university-industry collaboration and knowledge transfer may be no 
less exaggerated. The emphasis on the Bayh-Dole Act as a catalyst to these interactions also seems 
somewhat misplaced.” 
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Possibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-
century was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Together with amendments in 1984 and augmentation in 
1986, this unlocked all the inventions and discoveries that had been made in laboratories through the 
United States with the help of taxpayers’ money. More than anything, this single policy measure 
helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance. Before Bayh-Dole, the 
fruits of research supported by government agencies had gone strictly to the federal government. 
Nobody could exploit such research without tedious negotiations with a federal agency concerned. 
Worse, companies found it nearly impossible to acquire exclusive rights to a government owned 
patent. And without that, few firms were willing to invest millions more of their own money to turn 
a basic research idea into a marketable product.5 
An even more enthusiastic assessment suggested that: 
 The Bayh-Dole Act turned out to be the Viagra for campus innovation. Universities that 
would previously have let their intellectual property lie fallow began filing for – and getting patents 
at unprecedented rates. Coupled with other legal, economic and political developments that also 
spurred patenting and licensing, the results seems nothing less than a major boom to national 
economic growth.6 
The mechanism or instrument attributed to facilitating the commercialization of 
university scientist research has been the university Technology Transfer Office (TTO). 
While the TTO was not an invention of the Bayh-Dole Act, its prevalence exploded 
following passage of the Act in 1980. Not only does the TTO typically engage in 
painstaking collection of the intellectual property disclosed by scientists to the university 
but also the extent of commercialization emanating from the TTO. The Association of 
University Technology Managers (AUTM) collects and reports a number of measures 
reflecting the intellectual property and commercialization of its member universities. A 
voluminous and growing body of research has emerged documenting the impact of TTOs 
on the commercialization of university research. Most of these studies focus on various 
measures of output associated with university TTOs (Shane, 2004, Siegel and Phan, 2005; 
Mowery, 2005.) By most accounts, the impact on facilitating the commercialization of 
university science research has been impressive. For example, as Figure 1 shows, the 
number of patents registered by universities exploded subsequent to passage of Bayh-Dole.  
                                                 
5 “Innovation’s Golden Goose,” The Economist, 12 December, 2002. 
6  Cited in Mowery (2005, p. 64) 
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However, there are compelling reasons to suspect that measuring and analyzing the 
commercialization of university research by relying solely upon the intellectual property 
disclosed to and registered by the TTOs may lead to a systematic underestimation of 
commercialization and innovation emanating from university research. The mandate of the 
TTO is not to measure and document all of the intellectual property created by university 
research along with the subsequent commercialization. Rather, what is measured and 
documented is the intellectual property and commercialization activities with which the 
TTO is involved. This involvement is typically a subset of the broader and more pervasive 
intellectual property being generated by university research and its commercialization 
which may or may not involve the TTO office (Thursby and Thursby, 2005). For example, 
in his exhaustive study on academic spinoffs, Scott Shane (2004, p. 4) warns: 
Sometimes patents, copyrights and other legal mechanisms are used to protect the 
intellectual property that leads to spinoffs, while at other times the intellectual property that leads to 
a spinoff company formation takes the form of know how or trade secrets. Moreover, sometimes 
entrepreneurs create university spinoffs by licensing university inventions, while at other times the 
spinoffs are created without the intellectual property being formally licensed from the institution in 
which it was created. These distinctions are important for two reasons. First it is harder for 
researchers to measure the formation of spinoff companies created to exploit intellectual property 
that is not protected by legal mechanisms or that has not been disclosed by inventors to university 
administrators. As a result, this book likely underestimates the spin-off activity that occurs to exploit 
inventions that are neither patented nor protected by copyrights. This book also underestimates the 
spin-off activity that occurs “through the back door”, that is companies founded to exploit 
technologies that investors fail to disclose to university administrators. 
There is little empirical evidence supporting Shane’s admonition that relying solely 
upon the data registered with and collected by the TTO will result in a systematic 
underestimation of commercialization of university research. Such an underestimation of 
commercialization of university research may lead to an underestimation of the impact that 
spillovers of investment in university research have on innovation and ultimately economic 
growth.  
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If the spillover of knowledge generated by university research is viewed as 
essential for economic growth, employment creation, and international competitiveness in 
global markets, the systematic underreporting of university spillovers resulting from the 
commercialization of scientist research concomitantly may lead to severe policy 
distortions. Thus, rather than relying on commercialization reported by the TTO to 
measure and analyze the commercialization of university research, this chapter instead 
develops alternative measures based on the commercialization activities reported by 
scientists. In particular, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a measure of scientist 
commercialization of university research and identify which factors are conducive to 
scientist commercialization and which factors inhibit scientist commercialization. We do 
this by developing a new database measuring the propensity of scientists funded by grants 
from the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to commercialize their research as well as the 
mode of commercialization. We then subject this new university scientist-based data set to 
empirical scrutiny to ascertain which factors influence both the propensity and mode of 
scientist commercialization of university research. 
As the second section of this chapter makes clear, there is no singular mode for 
scientist commercialization of research. Thus, in the third section, four distinct measures of 
scientist commercialization of research are introduced and explained: patents, SBIR 
awards, new firm startups and licenses. The main factors influencing the decision scientists 
make in choosing to commercialize their research are introduced in the fourth section. The 
four modes of commercialization are used to empirically identify the main determinants of 
scientist commercialization of research in the fifth section. Finally, in the last section, a 
summary and conclusion are provided. In particular, the results of this chapter suggest that 
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exclusive reliance upon measures of commercialization of university research published by 
the TTOs may systematically underestimate the contribution university research makes to 
commercialization, innovation and ultimately economic growth. University scientists 
appear to be more vigorously involved in entrepreneurial activity, in the form of starting 
new science-based firms, than had been perceived by relying solely upon the more easily 
accessible databases offered by the TTOs. In particular, over one-quarter of the scientists 
who were awarded a patent report that they have also started their own business, which is 
an astonishingly high rate of entrepreneurship based on comparable measures for other 
sub-groups of the population. Scientist entrepreneurship appears to be the sleeping giant of 
the commercialization of university research.  
The modes of research commercialization used by NCI funded scientists are quite 
heterogeneous with respect to both prevalence and determinants. Reliance on publicly 
accessible databases, such as patents and SBIR, represent, at best, the tip of the iceberg of 
commercialization activities by NCI scientists. Other important commercialization modes, 
such as new-firm startups, can only be measured and analyzed by creating new systematic 
and comprehensive sources of data. In addition, both the prevalence and mode of 
commercialization vary considerably across scientists. Not all scientists are equally helped 
by the TTOs. Those that do report being helped by the TTO have a higher propensity to 
license their intellectual property to an existing firm but a lower propensity to start a new 
firm. By contrast, scientists reporting not being helped by the TTO have a lower propensity 
to license their intellectual property to existing firms but a higher propensity to start their 
own firm.  
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Scientists assigning their patents to the TTO, or those commercializing through the 
TTO route, exhibit a higher propensity to commercialize their research by licensing but not 
by starting a new firm. By contrast, those scientists choosing what we term as the 
entrepreneurial route to commercialize their research, in that they do not assign all of their 
patents to the TTO, exhibit a higher propensity to start a new firm but a lower likelihood of 
licensing their intellectual property. 
Social capital and networks, as measured by the extent to which a scientist engages 
in industry co-publication, co-patenting with other NCI scientists, and serving on a 
company board of directors or scientific advisory board (SAB) clearly promote the 
likelihood of commercialization, particularly for the mode of entrepreneurship. The impact 
of social capital on entrepreneurial activity is more pronounced for scientists not helped by 
the TTO, suggesting that social networks may be an additional mechanism to the TTO in 
facilitating the commercialization of university research.  
3.2 Scientist Commercialization of University Research 
 
Why and how will scientists decide to commercialize their scientific research? One 
answer to the question of why was provided by Stephan and Levin (1992), who suggest 
that a scientist will choose to commercialize research if this furthers her life goals. But how 
should a scientist best appropriate the value of her human capital? That is, what mode of 
commercialization is most appropriate for a given scientist with a stock of knowledge and 
scientific human capital? Alternatives abound, such as working full time or part time with 
an incumbent firm, licensing the knowledge to an incumbent firm, starting a new firm, or 
joining an existing firm.  
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Previous studies have identified several major modes of scientist 
commercialization. Ownership of intellectual property, in the form of patented inventions, 
is an important step in the commercialization process. Jaffe and Lerner (2001), Henderson, 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) and Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) all identify 
patents as an important mode by which scientists commercialize their research. 
Thursby and Jensen (2005), Thursby, Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Jensen and 
Thursby (2001) identify both patents and the licensing of patents as important modes of 
scientist commercialization. In particular, Thursby and Jensen (2004, p. 4) employ a 
principal-agent framework in which the university administration is the principal and the 
faculty scientist is the agent, and identify that the “whether or not the researcher remains in 
the university, and if so her choice of the amount of time to spend on basic and applied 
research, is complicated by the fact that she earns license income and prestige both inside 
and outside the university.” 
Several studies have identified the important role that the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program can play as a mode of scientist commercialization 
(Lerner, 1999; Audretsch, Link and Scott, 2002). Toole and Czarnitzki (2005) find that 
only eight percent of the unique Principle Investigators (PIs) were awarded an SBIR grant 
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services between 1983 and 1996, which 
suggests that the SBIR may perhaps be an important instrument of public policy, but not a 
prevalent mechanism for commercializing university scientist research. 
A different mode of commercialization involves academic entrepreneurship, where 
the scientist starts a new firm to bring her research to the market. Louis, Blumenthal, 
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Gluck and Sioto (1989) identify the role of individual characteristics and attitudes, along 
with the norms of scientific peer groups as important factors in influencing the scientists’ 
decision to commercialize their research in the form of a new-firm startup. Similarly, 
Shane (2004), Lockett, Siegel, Wright and Ensley (2005), Zucker, Darby and Brewer 
(1997), O’Shea, Allen, Chevalier and Roche (2005) and Audretsch and Stephan (1996 and 
1999) focus on the role that new-firm startups play as a conduit for commercializing 
scientific research. Thus, research has pointed to four principle modes of scientist 
commercialization: patents, SBIR, licenses, and new-firm startups. 
3.3 Measurement Issues 
 
The commercialization activity of university scientists was measured by starting 
with those scientists awarded a research grant by the National Cancer Institute between 
1998 and 2002. Of those research grant awards, the largest twenty percent, which 
corresponded to 1,693 scientist awardees, were taken to form the database used in this 
chapter. The National Cancer Institute (NCI) awarded a total of $5,350,977,742 to the 
1,693 highest funded quintile of United States-based scientists from 1998 to 2002.  
Since the focus of this chapter is on the propensity for scientists to commercialize 
their research, commercialization must be operationalized and measured. Based on the 
literature identified in the previous section, five main measures of scientist 
commercialization are used, which reflect five different modes by which scientists can and 
do commercialize their research. These are (1) patenting inventions, (2) issuing licenses, 
(3) receiving an SBIR grant to obtain funding for an innovative small business, (4) starting 
a new firm, and (5) selling a patent. In fact, there certainly are additional modes of 
commercialization remaining unexplored by this chapter. Examples include non-patenting 
 21
scientists who start a new firm, the mobility of students or faculty from the university to 
the private sector, consulting contracts, and informal interactions. The absence of these 
types of modes of commercialization of university research by scientists from this chapter 
does not suggest that they are unimportant, but rather that they are difficult to measure. 
Based on these five different measures reflecting distinct modes of scientist 
commercialization of research, an NCI awardee database was created to answer the 
question, “Why do some scientists commercialize while others do not?” 
3.3.1 Patents 
The first measure of commercialization of research by an NCI award scientist is 
inventions which are patented. The propensity for NCI award scientists to patent was 
analyzed by obtaining patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO).7 The patent database spans 1975 to 2004 and contains over three million 
patents.  
To match the patent records with the 1,692 NCI recipient scientists, Structured 
Query Language (SQL) and Python programming languages were written to extract and 
manipulate data. A match between the patentee and NCI awardee databases was 
considered to be positive if all four of the following necessary conditions were met: 
(1) A positive match was made with the first, middle, and last name. If, for 
example, the scientist did not have a middle name listed on either the NCI award database 
                                                 
7 On July 25th, 2005, Jim Hirabashi of the Office of Electronic Information Products at the patent 
Technology Monitoring Division was sent a request order for the “U.S. Patent CDs” from 1975 to 2004.  
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or the patent database, but did have a positive first and last name, this first condition was 
considered to be fulfilled. 
(2) The second criterion involved matching the relevant time periods between the 
two databases. Observations from both databases were matched over the time period 1998-
2004, which corresponds to the initial year in which observations were available from the 
NCI database (1998-2002) and the final year in which patents were recorded in the patent 
database (1975-2004). Because applications of patents may take anywhere from three 
months to two years to be issued, the 2003 and 2004 USPTO patent records were included 
in our query. Issued patents from 1998 to 2004 by NCI scientists fulfilled the second 
criterion. 
(3) The third criterion was based on location. If the patentee resided within an 
approximate radius of 60 miles from the geographic location of the university, the third 
condition was fulfilled. 
 (4) The fourth criterion was based on USPTO patent classification. Using the 
USPTO patent classification code, all patents were separated into respective coding 
groups. Patents which did not fall under the traditional categories of biotechnology were 
identified. All non biotech patents were evaluated and patents such as “Bread Alfalfa 
Enhancer” were rejected as an NCI scientist patent (see Appendix A for a distribution of 
patent categories).  
 Based on these four match criteria, a subset of 398 distinctly issued patentees were 
identified between 1998 and 2004 with a total of 1,204 patents.  
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3.3.2 Survey Implementation 
After identifying the full set of NCI patentees, a survey instrument was designed 
with two main criteria: 
(1) To maximize information without overly burdening the nation’s top 
medical scientists. Reducing the time and input burden imposed on the 
scientist was considered to have a favorable impact on the response 
rate; and 
(2) To maximize information revealing the creation of intellectual property 
and its subsequent commercialization through licensing and 
entrepreneurial activity, while at the same time respecting the need for 
scientist confidentiality and not confronting the scientist with 
information requests that might compromise such confidentiality. 
Based on these two criteria, an interview instrument was designed probing four 
subgroups of issues: licensing, entrepreneurship, social capital and the role of the TTO. 
The question in the licensing section asked if the scientist has licensed. The 
question contained in the entrepreneurship section identified whether the scientist started a 
new firm. The questions concerning social capital asked the scientist if she sat on any 
industry science advisory boards (SAB) or board of directors, the extent to which the NCI 
grant award facilitated commercialization, along with other sources of major funding 
received from a governmental agency. The questions concerning the influence of the TTO 
asked whether the university’s TTO “directly helped you to commercialize your research 
between 1998 to 2004”. 
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The 398 patenting scientists were “Googled” to obtain their e-mail and telephone 
information. The records could, generally, be found by typing their full name, university 
and the word “oncology”. The ensuing patentee e-mail accounts and telephone numbers 
were then collected and registered in the scientist database. Of those 398 scientists 
identified in the database, 146 responded. Six respondents indicated that they had not 
patented the ascribed patents, therefore reducing the number of patentees to 392. The 
number of respondent, therefore, reflects a response rate of 36 percent. NCI awarded 
scientists commercializing through patents varied from those not commercializing in 
several important ways.  
Figure 2 shows that the distribution of patentees varied both across institutions as 
well as by gender. In Ivy League and public institutions, the propensity for females to 
patent exceeded that of their male colleagues. Male scientists at universities with an NCI 
Center, however, had a greater propensity to patent.  
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Figure 3.2: Patents by Institution and Gender 
 
Gender also clearly played a role in a number of other dimensions. For example, 
Figure 3 shows that the mean amount of the NCI grant was considerably greater for male 
scientists who patented than for their female counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
12.24% 
47.81%
57.43%
12.50% 
50.00% 50.00% 
10.24% 
53.91%
55.86% 
0% 
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Ivy League Public Institution NCI Center 
Institution Type
Percentage of Scientists
Male Patentee
Female Patentee
All NCI Scientists
 26
 
Figure 3.3: NCI Grant Award by Gender for Patenting Scientists 
 
 
3.3.4 Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
The second measure of scientist commercialization involves scientists awarded 
SBIR grants to finance innovative small businesses. Enactment of the SBIR program in the 
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Congress mandated each federal agency with allocating around four percent of its annual 
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international competitiveness (Wessner, 2000). SBIR provides a mandate to the major 
R&D agencies in the United States to allocate a share of the research budget to innovative 
small firms. In 2001 the SBIR program amounted to around $1.4 billion. The SBIR 
consists of three phases. Phase I is oriented towards determining the scientific and 
technical merit along with the feasibility of a proposed research idea. A Phase I Award 
provides an opportunity for a small business to establish the feasibility and technical merit 
of a proposed innovation. The duration of the award is six months and cannot exceed 
$70,000. Phase II extends the technological idea and emphasizes commercialization. A 
Phase II Award is granted to only the most promising of the Phase I projects based on 
scientific/technical merit, the expected value to the funding agency, company capability 
and commercial potential. The duration of the award is a maximum of 24 months and 
generally does not exceed $600,000. Approximately 40 percent of the Phase I Awards 
continue on to Phase II. Phase III involves additional private funding for the commercial 
application of a technology. A Phase III Award is for the infusion of a product into the 
commercial market. Private sector investment, in various forms, is typically present in 
Phase III. Under the Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of 
1992, funding in Phase I was increased to $100,000 and in Phase II to $750,000. 
The SBIR represents about 60 percent of all public entrepreneurial finance 
programs (Lerner, 1999). Taken together, the public small-business finance is about two-
thirds as large as private venture capital. In 1995, the sum of equity financing provided 
through and guaranteed by public programs financing Small and Medium Enterprises was 
$2.4 billion, which amounted to more than 60 percent of the total funding disbursed by 
traditional venture funds in that year (Lerner, 1999). Equally as important, the emphasis on 
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SBIR and most public funds is on early stage finance, which is generally ignored by 
private venture capital. Some of the most innovative American companies received early 
stage finance from SBIR, including Apple Computer, Chiron, Compaq and Intel. 
There is compelling evidence that the SBIR program has had a positive impact on 
economic performance in the U.S. (Wessner, 2000; Audretsch, 2003; Audretsch, Weigand 
and Weigand, 2002; and Lerner, 1999). The relevant agency awarding SBIR grants to 
scientists for commercialization of science involving cancer research is the National 
Institutes of Health. This does not preclude the possibility that SBIR awards could be made 
to scientists engaged in cancer research from other agencies. The SBIR award data from 
the NIH between 1998 and 2002 is listed on the NIH home webpage at 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/award_data.htm.8  The information provided in each 
SBIR record in the NIH database includes the phase type of the award, fiscal year, state, 
formal organizational name, award, application type, grant number, principle investigator 
(PI), project title, contact name, contact e-mail, organization line, address, research partner, 
and whether the SBIR award was a new grant.  
Between 1998 and 2002, 6,461 SBIR awards were granted to 3,230 distinct 
scientists from the NIH. The Principle Investigator (PI) of each SBIR award was then 
matched to the 1,693 NCI scientists using an SQL program. Those scientists included in 
both the SBIR database as a PI and an NCI award recipient, and that were matched by last 
and first names, were considered for this chapter. The resulting 34 matches were then 
subjected to a location criterion: the address of the PI listed in the SBIR grant was matched 
                                                 
8 The acting director of the Office of Extramural Research at NIH, Joanne Goodnight, and the “general help 
e-mail address” were twice e-mailed and called to confirm the veracity of the website’s content. Neither the 
director nor any staff responded to confirmation requests. 
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to the NCI scientists using a 75 mile radius to the respective university. If the location was 
outside of a 75 mile radius, the match was not considered to be valid. For example, there 
are four PI scientists with the name David Johnson listed in the NIH SBIR database. Their 
addresses are given as Hamilton, Montana; Lawrence, Kansas; San Diego, California and 
Seattle, Washington. None of these addresses matched the two NCI recipients named 
David Johnson from Houston, Texas and Nashville, Tennessee. The geography criterion 
reduced the number of confirmed SBIR-NCI recipients to eight. Thus, one of the most 
striking insights to emerge in this chapter is that use of the SBIR is not a prevalent or even 
common mode of commercialization by scientists receiving NCI awards. 
The most striking feature of the (small) group of SBIR scientists is that they tend to 
be highly accomplished in terms of research output and reputation. As Table 3 shows, their 
citations were about three times as great as the overall group of NCI scientists. Most of the 
SBIR scientists are employed at NCI Centers. 
 Interestingly, the mean value of their NCI award was relatively low. Thus, there 
are considerable reasons to view those scientists funded by the NCI who also obtain an 
SBIR grant as being outliers. 
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3.4 Determinants of Scientist Commercialization 
 
3.4.1 Main Factors 
A number of theories and hypotheses have posited why some scientists choose to 
commercialize research while others do not, and some compelling insights have been 
garnered through previous empirical studies. These include the gender, age, experience and 
also reputation of the scientist, as well the role of scientific human capital and resources, 
and the regional and university contexts, which highlight the role of geographically 
bounded spillovers and institutional incentives. 
In addition to these control variables, which have already been probed in a number 
of studies examining factors that influence the propensity for a scientist to engage in 
commercialization activities, we also include a number of factors that can only be 
measured with the type of scientist-based data set constructed and described in the 
previous section. These additional factors include not just scientific human capital, but 
social capital as well, along with the role of the TTO, and the commercialization route 
selected by the scientist. 
3.4.2 Social Capital 
Social capital refers to meaningful interactions and linkages the scientist has with 
others. While physical capital refers to the importance of machines and tools as a factor of 
production (Solow, 1956), the endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 1990; Lucas 1988) 
puts the emphasis on the process of knowledge accumulation, and hence the creation of 
knowledge capital. The concept of social capital (Putnam, 1993 and Coleman, 1988) can 
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be considered a further extension because it adds a social component to those factors 
shaping economic growth and prosperity. According to Putnam (2000, p.19): 
 Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the 
properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks. 
By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital – tools and training that enhance 
individual productivity – social capital refers to features of social organization, such as networks 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits. 
 
A large and robust literature has emerged attempting to link social capital to 
entrepreneurship (Aldrich and Martinez, 2003; Aldrich, 2005; and Thorton and Flynn, 
2003). According to this literature, entrepreneurial activity should be enhanced where 
investments in social capital are greater. Interactions and linkages, such as working 
together with industry, are posited as conduits not just of knowledge spillovers but also for 
the demonstration effect providing a flow of information across scientists about how 
scientific research can be commercialized (Thursby and Thursby, 2004). Thus, the social 
capital of a scientist is posited to be conducive to the commercialization of research. 
3.4.3 Scientist Commercialization Route  
 Scientists choose to commercialize their research through two different routes. 
They can assign their patents to the university’s TTO, which we refer to as the TTO route. 
Alternatively, they can choose what we term the entrepreneurial route of 
commercialization. The entrepreneurial route to scientist commercialization refers to those 
scientists who do not assign all of their patents to the university’s TTO. Of the NCI 
patenting scientists, 70 percent assigned all of their patents to their university TTO and 30 
percent chose the entrepreneurial route to commercialize their research. 
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 Whether or not the particular commercialization route influences the 
commercialization mode is an empirical question best left for the data analysis to answer. 
3.4.4 Technology Transfer Office 
The TTO has a mandate to facilitate and promote the commercialization of 
university science. As the President of the Association of American Universities observed:  
Before Bayh-Dole, the federal government had accumulated 
30,000 patents, of which only 5% had been licensed and even fewer had 
found their way into commercial products. Today under Bayh-Dole more 
than 200 universities are engaged in technology transfer, adding more than 
$21 billion each year to the economy9  
The Commission of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office claimed: 
 In the 1970s, the government discovered that inventions that 
resulted from public funding were not reaching the marketplace 
because no one could make the additional investment to turn basic 
research into marketable products. That finding resulted in the Bayh-
Dole Act, passed in 1980. It enabled universities, small companies, 
and nonprofit organizations to commercialize the results of federally 
funded research. The results of Bayh-Dole have been significant. 
Before 1981, fewer than 250 patents were issued to universities each 
year. A decade later universities were averaging approximately 1,000 
patents a year.10  
This, presumably, would suggest that the TTO is expected to have a positive impact on 
scientist commercialization of university research. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that involvement of the TTO might 
not have the same impact across all modes of commercialization. For example, one 
response from the in-depth scientist interviews conducted in this chapter revealed: 
                                                 
9 Cited in Mowery (2005, p. 65) 
10 Cited in Mowery (2005, p. 65) 
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I refuse to work with the TTO. They have destroyed any of my 
commercial work. I have given up on any sort of commercial enterprises 
with my TTO. I don’t think any of my colleagues have attempted to 
commercialize anything here for the past six years.11 
Similarly, a different scientist shared that “My commercial spirit stops at the TTO door.”12 
 However, it is important to emphasize that such views are not reflective of all 
scientists. For example, a different scientist responded that “Our university technology 
transfer office does ok. They occasionally have some problems with some technical issues, 
but over all, they have served me for the better.”13 
 Thus, the actual impact of the TTO on scientist commercialization in general and 
on the specific commercialization modes of entrepreneurship and licensing is a question 
best left to empirical scrutiny. 
3.4.5 Scientific Human Capital   
An implication of the knowledge production function is that those scientists with 
greater research and scientific prowess have the capacity for generating greater scientific 
output. But how does scientific capability translate into observable characteristics that can 
promote or impede commercialization efforts? Because the commercialization of scientific 
research is particularly risky and uncertain (Audretsch and Stephan, 2000), a strong 
scientific reputation, as evidenced through citations, provides a greatly valued signal of 
scientific credibility and capability to any anticipated commercialized venture or project. 
This suggests a hypothesis linking measures of the quality of the scientist, or her scientific 
reputation as measured by citations, to commercialization. 
                                                 
11 NCI scientist quote taken on January 25th, 2005 
12 NCI scientist quote taken January 15th, 2005 
13 NCI scientist quote taken on October 12th, 2005 
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3.4.6 Scientific Resources 
The question of why some contexts generate more innovative activity than others 
has been the subject of considerable research in economics. While the conventional 
approach to analyzing innovative output at the microeconomic level has been at the level 
of the firm, it conceivably can apply to the unit of analysis of the individual knowledge 
worker, such as a scientist. The fundamental questions addressed in this literature are: 
“What do firms do to generate innovative output?” and “Why are some firms more 
innovative than others?” For the unit of observation of the individual scientist, this 
question translates into: “What do scientists do to generate innovative output?” and “Why 
are some scientists more engaged in commercialization of scientific activity than others?” 
In what Zvi Griliches (1979) formalized as the model of the knowledge production 
function, knowledge generating inputs are linked to innovative outputs. Griliches, in fact, 
suggested that it was investments in knowledge inputs that would generate the greatest 
yield in terms of innovative output. 
This might suggest a hypothesis that the propensity for a scientist to engage in 
commercialization activity is positively related to the amount of the award, on the grounds 
that a greater award amount, ceteris paribus, represents a greater investment in new 
knowledge. 
3.4.7 Scientist Life-Cycle  
A large literature has emerged focusing on what has become known as the 
appropriability problem. The underlying issue revolves around how firms which invest in 
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the creation of new knowledge can best appropriate the economic returns from that 
knowledge (Arrow, 1962). Audretsch (1995) proposed shifting the unit of observation 
away from exogenously assumed firms to individuals — agents with endowments of new 
economic knowledge. When the lens is shifted away from the firm to the individual as the 
relevant unit of analysis, the appropriability issue remains, but the question becomes; 
"How can scientists with a given endowment of new knowledge best appropriate the 
returns from that knowledge?" Levin and Stephan (1991) suggest that the answer is, It 
depends – it depends on both the career trajectory as well as the stage of the life-cycle of 
the scientist. 
The university or academic career trajectory encourages and rewards the production 
of new scientific knowledge. Thus, the goal of the scientist in the university context is to 
establish priority. This is done most efficiently through publication in scientific journals 
(Audretsch and Stephan, 2000). By contrast, with a career trajectory in the private sector, 
scientists are rewarded for the production of new economic knowledge, or knowledge 
which has been commercialized in the market, but not necessarily new scientific 
knowledge per se. In fact, scientists working in industry are often discouraged from 
sharing knowledge externally with the scientific community through publication. As a 
result of these differential incentive structures, industrial and academic scientists develop 
distinct career trajectories. 
The appropriability question confronting academic scientists can be considered in 
the context of the model of scientist human capital over the life-cycle. Scientist life-cycle 
models suggest that early in their careers scientists invest heavily in human capital in order 
to build a scientific reputation (Levin and Stephan, 1991). In the later stages of their career, 
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the scientist trades or cashes in this reputation for economic return. Thus, early in her 
career, the scientist invests in the creation of scientific knowledge in order to establish a 
reputation that signals the value of that knowledge to the scientific community.  
With maturity, scientists seek ways to appropriate the economic value of the new 
knowledge. Thus, academic scientists may seek to commercialize their scientific research 
within a life-cycle context. The life-cycle model of the scientist implies that, ceteris 
paribus, scientist age should play a role in the decision to commercialize. In the early 
stages of her career, a scientist will tend to invest in her scientific reputation. As she 
evolves towards maturity and the marginal productivity of her scientific research starts to 
hit diminishing returns, the incentive for cashing in through commercialization becomes 
greater. 
Scientists working in the private sector are arguably more fully compensated for 
the economic value of their knowledge. This will not be the case for academic scientists, 
unless they cash out, in terms of Dasgupta and David (1994), by commercializing their 
scientific knowledge. This suggests that academic scientists seek commercialization within 
a life-cycle context. This life-cycle context presents two distinct hypotheses: both age and 
scientific reputation should influence the decision of a university scientist to engage in 
commercialization activities. 
3.4.8 Locational and Institutional Contexts 
Scientist location can influence the decision to commercialize for two reasons. 
First, as Jaffe (1989), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 
(1993), and Glaeser, Kallal, Sheinkman and Shleifer (2002) show, knowledge tends to spill 
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over within geographically bounded regions. This implies that scientists working in 
regions with a high level of investments in new knowledge can more easily access and 
generate new scientific ideas. This suggests that scientists working in knowledge clusters 
should tend to be more productive than their counterparts who are geographically isolated. 
As Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992, p. 1,126) have observed, “Intellectual 
breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and continents.” 
A second component of externalities involves not the technological knowledge, but 
rather behavioral knowledge. As Bercoviz and Feldman (2004) show for a study based on 
the commercialization activities of scientists at Johns Hopkins University and Duke 
University, the likelihood of a scientist engaging in commercialization activity, which is 
measured as disclosing an invention, is shaped by the commercialization behaviour of the 
doctoral supervisor in the institution where the scientist was trained, as well as the 
commercialization behaviour and attitudes exhibited by the chair and peers in the relevant 
department. Similarly, based on a study of 778 faculty members from 40 universities, 
Louis et al. (1998) find that it is the local norms of behaviour and attitudes towards 
commercialization that shape the likelihood of an individual university scientist to engage 
in commercialization activity, in their case by starting a new firm. 
Thus, the location and institutional contexts can influence the propensity for 
scientists to engage in commercialization activities by providing access to spatially 
bounded knowledge spillovers and by shaping the institutional setting and behavioural 
norms and attitudes towards commercialization. 
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3.5 Estimation of a Probit Model 
To shed light on the question; “Why do some scientists commercialize their scientific 
research while others do not?” a probit model was estimated for the unit of observation of the 
scientist identified in the NCI database where the dependent variable takes on the value of one 
if she has commercialized over the time period 1998-2004 and zero if she has not.  As the 
previous section emphasized, there is no singular mode for scientist commercialization. Rather, 
scientists select across multiple modes of possible commercialization. Thus, the probit model 
was estimated for each of the main modes of commercialization – patents, licenses, new-firm 
startups, patent selling and SBIR discussed in the previous section. Each of these measures of 
commercialization is described and defined in Table 1. Because the sample size is large enough 
to warrant empirical estimation with a probit model, only four of the measures of 
commercialization- patents, licensing and startups, and commercializing -- could be used. 
Table 3.1: Variable Description of The Modes of Commercialization 
Dependent Variables Description 
 
Patenting Scientist National Cancer Institute grant awarded 
scientist who patented from 1998 to 2004 
(Sample 1693, N=392) 
SBIR Grant Scientist Scientist awarded an SBIR grant  
(Sample 1693, N=8) 
Startup Scientist Scientist who responded to survey question 
that she started new firm  
(Sample=140, N=36) 
Licensing Scientist Scientist who responded to survey question 
that she licensed (Sample=140, N=71) 
Commercializing Scientist Scientist who patented or licensed 
(Sample=140, N=83) 
Patent Selling Scientist Scientist who sold ownership of the patent 
(Sample=75, N=4)14 
                                                 
14 Selling patents are dropped from the analysis due to the small number of patent sellers (N=4). 
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The previous section suggests five different types of factors shaping the decision by 
a scientist to commercialize her research: social capital, the TTO, resources, age, scientific 
human capital (quality), nature of the university, and location. These factors are 
empirically operationalized through the following measures: 
Social Capital 
Co-patents – This variable reflects the extent of social capital and linkages between 
scientists by measuring the number of patents where two NCI scientists shared a patent. It 
is expected to have a positive coefficient, reflecting the propensity for social capital to be 
positively related to scientist commercialization of research. 
Board – This is a binary variable taking on the value of one if the scientist has sat on a 
scientific advisory board or the board of directors of a firm. A positive coefficient would 
indicate that social capital, as reflected by board membership, is conducive to the 
commercialization of university research.  
Industry Co-publications – This variable reflects social capital and linkages between 
university scientists and their counterparts in industry and is measured as co-authorship 
between a university scientist and an industry scientist in the Science Citation Index using 
the Institute for Scientist Information (ISI) Web of Science citation database. The total 
count of papers coauthored with an industry scientist between the years of 1998 and 2004 
was estimated using several search queries on the ISI database. Using the address fields 
within each publication value in the ISI database, Co-publications were identified as a 
private sector address if the terms Co, Co Ltd, Inc, or LLC, were found. Also, in order to 
not misidentify the University of Colorado as a company, for example, the query forced 
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the previously mentioned search terms to be standalone words, and not part of larger 
words. The coefficient is expected to be positive, which would reflect that university-
industry scientist interactions are conducive to commercialization.  
Industry Co-publication Asia -- This variable reflects social capital and linkages between 
university scientists and their counterparts located in Asia. Scientist linkages are measured 
as co-authorship between a university and an Asian scientist in the Science Citation Index 
using the ISI Web of Science citation database. Using the address fields within each 
publication value of the ISI Web of Science citation index Industry Co-publication Asia 
was identified if any of the terms of China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were found in 
the ISI Web of Science address field. A binary variable was then created, taking on the 
value of one for all scientists with linkages in Asia and zero otherwise. The coefficient is 
expected to be positive which would reflect that interactions involving scientists located in 
Asia are conducive to commercialization.  
Scientist Commercialization Route 
Non TTO Assignee – This is a binary variable taking on the value of one for scientists who 
had at least one patent which was not assigned to their universities’ TTO office, reflecting 
the TTO route to commercialization. According to the U.S. Patent Trademark Office a 
patent assignee may be defined as “The assignee, when the patent is assigned to him or her, 
becomes the owner of the patent and has the same rights that the original patentee had. The 
statute [of law] also provides for the assignment of a part interest, that is, a half interest, a 
fourth interest etc., in a patent.”15 Scientists not assigning a patent to their TTO are 
                                                 
15 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general 
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considered to choose the entrepreneurial route to commercialize their research. A positive 
coefficient would indicate that those scientists who have at least one non TTO assignee 
patent have a higher propensity to commercialize their research. A negative coefficient 
would suggest that those scientists choosing the TTO route are more likely to engage in 
commercializing their research. 
 Of the 392 patentees, 29.80 percent were determined to choose the entrepreneurial 
route to commercialization, in that they assigned at least one patent not to their university. 
For example, seven out of eight of Dr. Jon Doe’s patent assignees belonged to the Curators 
of the University of Missouri. The eighth patent was assigned ownership to Pfizer, Inc. and 
not to the Curators of the University of Missouri. This example is typical of the 
entrepreneurial route to commercialization and was therefore categorized as a Non TTO 
Patent Assignee. In comparison, 70.20 percent of the 392 patenting scientist selected the 
TTO route to commercialization, in that they assigned all of their patents to the TTO. 
 
Technology Transfer Office 
 
TTO Helpful – This is a binary variable taking on the value of one for scientists who 
responded to the survey that their TTO directly helped them commercialize their research 
and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient would indicate that those scientists reporting that 
their TTO was helpful in commercializing their research have a higher propensity to 
commercialize their research. 
TTO Age – This variable reflects the TTO age and is measured as the year in which the 
TTO was founded at the particular university. The measure is taken from the AUTM 
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database. Because more recent years indicate a younger TTO, a positive coefficient would 
reflect a negative relationship between TTO age and the propensity for scientists to 
commercialize.  
TTO Employees – This variable measures the mean number of employees per year 
responsible for license and patent acquisitions. The measure is taken from the AUTM 
database. A positive relationship would suggest that a greater commitment of TTO 
employee resources yields a higher propensity for scientists to commercialize their 
research.  
TTO Licensing Commitment – Dividing the number of employees dedicated to licensing 
technology by the number of administrative employees reflects the commitment of the 
TTO to licensing relative to other TTO functions. This measure is derived from the AUTM 
database.  A positive relationship would suggest that allocating a greater share of TTO 
employees to licensing would increase scientist commercialization. 
TTO Efficiency – The mean number of patents applied for is divided by the number of 
issued patents, which reflects the efficiency of the TTO. This measure is derived from the 
AUTM database. A positive coefficient would reflect that a higher yield of patent 
applications resulting in patents granted lead to greater scientist commercialization.  
Scientific Human Capital  
Scientist Citations – A specific computer program was designed to measure the citations of 
NCI  scientists between 1998 and 2004 through the “Expanded Science Citation Index.” A 
higher number of citations reflects a higher level of human capital and scientific reputation 
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(Audretsch and Stephan, 2000). A positive coefficient would reflect that the likelihood of 
commercialization is greater for more productive scientists. 
Prior Patents – This variable is measured as the number of patents issued to a scientist 
prior to 1998. The variable is included to control for previous experience with 
commercialization activities. A positive coefficient would suggest that, even after 
controlling for the influences of social capital, the TTO, scientific human capital, 
resources, age, and locational and institutional contexts, previous commercialization 
experiences elevates the propensity of a scientist to engage in commercialization activity.  
Resources 
NCI Grant – This variable is the mean total NCI grant awarded to a scientist between 1998 
and 2002. If external funding of scientific research is conducive to commercialization, a 
positive coefficient of the NCI Grant would be expected.16  
Government Funding – This binary variable takes on the value of one for scientists 
responding to the scientist survey that they received additional funding in excess of 
$750,000 from government sources and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient would 
indicate that an increase in funding from the government facilitates scientist 
commercialization. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The NCI grant coefficient was multiplied by 1,000 for presentation purposes 
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Scientist Life-Cycle 
Scientist Age -- The age of the scientist, measured in terms of years, was obtained from the 
scientist survey. The Life-Cycle hypothesis of Stephan and Levin (1990) suggests a 
positive coefficient, which would reflect a higher propensity for more mature scientists to 
engage in commercialization activities.  
Gender – This is a dummy variable assigned the value of one for males (1,310) of the 
overall 1,693 included in the NCI database. The gender of each scientist was obtained by 
“Googling” their names and finding their picture profile online. The estimated coefficient 
will reflect whether the gender of the scientist influences the propensity to commercialize 
research. 
Locational and Institutional Contexts 
Three different locational binary variables taking on the value of one for the North 
East, which includes all states on the Eastern Seaboard between Washington, D.C. and 
Maine (Washington, D.C., Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland and Vermont), California and the Great 
Lakes (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin). Those regions which tend to have 
greater investments in research and science, and also have developed a culture more 
encouraging of university and scientist commercialization, such as California and the 
North East, might be expected to have a positive coefficient. 
NCI Center – This is a binary variable taking on the value of one if the scientist is 
employed at one of the 39 nationally-recognized cancer centers, and zero otherwise. A 
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comprehensive cancer center integrates research activities across the three major areas of 
laboratory, clinical and population-based research. The comprehensive cancer centers 
generally have the mission to support research infrastructure, but some centers also provide 
clinical care and service, reflecting the priority that community outreach and information 
dissemination play at the centers.17 A positive coefficient would reflect that being located 
at a comprehensive center facilitates commercialization. 
Ivy League – A binary variable taking on the value of one for all scientists employed at 
Brown University, Cornell University, Columbia University, Dartmouth College, Harvard 
University, Princeton University, the University of Pennsylvania and Yale University, and 
zero otherwise.  
Public Institution – A binary variable taking on the value of one for scientists employed at 
public universities and zero otherwise. Because they are at least partially financed by the 
public, state universities tend to have a stronger mandate for outreach and 
commercialization of research. This may suggest a positive coefficient. 
 The definitions of the independent variables are summarized in Table 2. The means 
and standard deviations of all variables are provided in Table 3. Table 4 provides a 
correlation matrix between all variables.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 http://www3.cancer.gov/cancercenters/description.html 
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Table 3.2: Description of Independent Variables 
Independent Variables 
 
Description 
 
Co-patents The number of times a patenting scientist shared a patent with another NCI scientist 
Industry Co-publications The number of publications an NCI scientist shared with a private industry scientist 
Board Binary variable, for scientists indicating that they sat on either a board of directors or science advisory board, Board=1 
TTO Helpful Binary variable, for scientists indicating that the “TTO directly helped you commercialize your research”, TTO Helpful=1 
Government Funding Binary variable, for scientists indicating that they received at least $750,000 of funding from a governmental source, Government Funding=1 
Non TTO Assignee Binary variable, for scientists who had at least one patent where the assignee was not the scientist’s university, Non TTO Assignee=1 
Industry Co-publications Asia Binary variable, for scientists who shared a co-publication with a scientist located in Asia, Industry Co-publications Asia=1 
NCI Helpful Binary variable, for scientists indicating that the NCI grant was helpful for patenting, NCI Helpful=1 
TTO Age Year when TTO was founded 
TTO Employees The mean annual number of TTO employees dedicated to licensing and patenting 
TTO Licensing Commitment The number of TTO employees dedicated to licensing and patenting divided by administrative employees 
TTO Efficiency The ratio of patent applications to patents issued by the TTO at the scientist’s university 
NCI Grant Total amount of funding received by a scientist 
Scientist Age The age of the scientist 
Gender Binary variable, where a male=1 
Scientist Citations The number of citations a scientist had,  1998 - 2004 
Prior Patents The number of issued patents a scientist had, 1975 - 1998 
NCI Center Binary variable, for a scientist whose institution is recognized by NCI as a comprehensive center for cancer research, NCI Center=1 
Ivy League Binary variable, for a scientist whose institution is an Ivy League university, Ivy League=1 
North East Binary Variable, for a scientist’s institution that is in CT, DC, MA, MD, NJ, NH, PA, RI or VT. North East=1 
California Binary variable, for a scientist’s institution located in California, California=1 
Great Lakes Binary variable, for a scientist’s institution that is located in IL, IN, MI, OH,  or WI 
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Table 3.3: Means and Standard Deviations of All Variables 
 NCI Scientist SBIR Scientist Patent Scientist Interviewed Scientist 
Variable N=1693 N=8 N=392 N=140 
Patent (%) 23.35 25.00 100.00 100.00 
 (0.42) (0.46)   
License (%) - - - 50.71 
    (0.50) 
Startup (%) - 100 - 25.71 
    (0.44) 
Commercialize (%) - 100 - 59.29 
    (0.49) 
Industry Co-publications  1.83 3.75 3.01 2.56 
 (3.57)  (4.89) (3.73) 
Asia Industry Co-publications (%) 37.00 50.00 48.00 8.50 
 (0.48) (0.53) (0.50) (0.28) 
Board (%) - - - 58.00 
    (0.50) 
Co-patents - - 3.13 1.18 
   (4.26) (3.97) 
- - - 38.04 Government Funding (%) 
    (0.49) 
TTO Helpful (%) - - - 53.13 
    (0.50) 
Non TTO Assignee (%) - 50.00 29.98 20.14 
  (0.70) (0.45) (0.40) 
TTO Employees 8.66 9.45 9.14 8.95 
 (11.44) (14.52) (11.6) (11.65) 
TTO Age 1981.70 1986 1980.77 1980.74 
 (11.35) (5.11) (11.29) (11.25) 
1.68 1.76 1.31 1.22 TTO Licensing Commitment 
 (2.29) (2.08) (1.45) (1.24) 
TTO Efficiency (%) 0.32 0.306 0.343 0.372 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) 
NCI Grant  (Dollars) 3,161,943 2,744,319 3,484,128 3,053,465 
 (3,196,918) (1,533,956) (3,795,993) (2,674,288) 
Gender (%) 77.87 87.50 87.85 88.57 
 (0.42) (0.35) (0.33) (0.32) 
NCI Helpful (%) - - - 45.04 
    (0.50) 
Scientist Age  - - - 56.76 
    (8.40) 
Scientist Citations 1316.44 3770.00 1741.19 1500.34 
 (2472.29) (9133.90) (2441.07) (1603.49) 
Prior Patents 1.35 1.63 4.40 3.88 
 (4.92) (1.18) (9.28) (6.47) 
NCI Center (%) 55.86 75.00 56.50 50.70 
 (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) 
Public Institution (%) 53.91 50.00 48.10 49.29 
 (0.50) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50) 
Ivy League (%) 10.24 0.00 12.15 15.00 
 (0.30) - (0.33) (0.36) 
North East (%) 34.84 37.50 37.22 41.43 
 (0.48) (0.51) (0.48) (0.51) 
California (%) 13.66 12.50 16.71 15.71 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.37) 
Great Lakes (%) 12.95 25.00 10.89 08.57 
 (0.34) (0.46) (0.31) (0.28) 
 Table 3.4: Simple Correlation Matrix 
 
Startup 
 
License 
 
Commercial 
 
Co-patent 
 
Industry 
Co-pubs 
Board 
 
TTO 
Helpful 
Gov’t 
Funding 
Non TTO  
Assignee 
Asia Co-
pub 
           
Startup 1.000          
License 0.203 1.000         
Commercial 0.520 0.802 1.000        
Co-patent -0.077 0.148 0.092 1.000       
Industry Co-pubs 0.166 0.127 0.220 0.049 1.000      
Board 0.446 0.305 0.340 -0.080 0.031 1.000     
TTO Helpful -0.113 0.284 0.280 0.149 0.007 0.014 1.000    
Gov’t Funding 0.135 0.101 0.147 -0.014 0.021 0.057 0.015 1.000   
Non TTO Assign 0.130 -0.276 -0.048 -0.071 -0.078 -0.141 -0.109 0.152 1.000  
Asia Co-pubs -0.080 0.132 0.191 -0.070 0.000 0.011 -0.074 -0.112 -0.103 1.000 
TTO Age -0.182 -0.083 -0.044 -0.108 -0.047 -0.206 -0.134 -0.024 0.046 0.106 
TTO Employees -0.015 0.051 -0.018 0.359 0.143 0.091 0.147 0.075 -0.144 -0.100 
TTO Commit 0.006 0.059 0.004 0.368 0.126 0.089 0.139 0.094 -0.113 -0.095 
TTO Efficiency 0.054 0.161 0.085 -0.127 0.133 -0.054 -0.033 -0.229 0.077 -0.112 
NCI Grant -0.053 -0.066 -0.031 0.165 0.073 0.120 0.250 0.031 -0.043 -0.027 
NCI Helpful 0.277 0.265 0.333 0.051 -0.010 0.213 0.343 0.027 -0.156 0.053 
Scientist Age -0.137 -0.100 -0.167 0.125 -0.166 -0.066 0.051 0.049 -0.127 -0.044 
Gender 0.157 -0.050 0.024 0.039 -0.017 0.315 0.027 0.023 0.007 0.091 
Scientist 
Citations -0.066 0.083 0.041 0.191 0.066 0.104 -0.052 0.085 -0.188 -0.073 
Prior Patents -0.051 0.156 0.156 0.583 -0.042 0.035 0.194 0.085 -0.028 -0.074 
NCI Center -0.057 0.124 0.113 0.091 0.237 -0.093 0.153 -0.254 -0.265 0.032 
Public Institution -0.075 -0.135 -0.203 0.100 -0.067 -0.031 -0.213 0.219 0.068 0.046 
Ivy League -0.007 0.248 0.264 -0.061 0.048 -0.100 0.175 -0.056 0.098 0.067 
North East 0.082 0.194 0.263 -0.108 -0.003 -0.012 0.104 -0.190 -0.055 0.127 
California 0.015 0.018 -0.015 0.250 0.217 0.130 0.099 0.020 -0.185 -0.126 
Great Lakes -0.108 0.067 0.005 0.028 0.087 0.052 0.075 0.055 0.030 0.119 
           
 
TTO Age 
 
TTO 
Emply 
TTO 
Commitment 
TTO 
Efficiency 
NCI 
Grant 
NCI 
Helpful 
Scientist 
Age 
Gender 
 
Scientist 
Citations 
Prior 
Patents 
           
TTO Age 1.000          
TTO Employees -0.189 1.000         
TTO Commit -0.166 0.983 1.000        
TTO Efficiency -0.154 -0.194 -0.193 1.000       
NCI Grant -0.315 0.150 0.134 -0.072 1.000      
NCI Helpful -0.090 0.205 0.200 -0.007 0.106 1.000     
Scientist Age -0.008 -0.038 -0.041 -0.169 0.041 0.004 1.000    
Gender -0.043 -0.015 -0.007 0.081 -0.058 0.086 0.056 1.000   
Scientist Citation -0.318 0.070 0.078 0.116 0.193 0.090 -0.103 0.053 1.000  
Prior Patent -0.017 0.133 0.142 -0.121 0.090 0.159 0.289 0.028 0.228 1.000 
NCI Center 0.143 0.232 0.268 0.150 -0.089 0.079 -0.099 -0.145 0.022 -0.040 
Public Institution 0.266 0.278 0.292 -0.196 0.073 0.132 0.259 0.181 -0.193 -0.023 
Ivy League 0.004 -0.152 -0.138 0.521 0.015 0.122 -0.214 -0.007 0.127 0.030 
North East -0.164 -0.213 -0.206 0.298 0.026 0.000 -0.221 -0.182 0.250 0.179 
California -0.179 0.791 0.746 -0.101 0.038 0.136 -0.027 0.052 0.026 -0.004 
Great Lakes 0.209 -0.137 -0.123 -0.242 -0.091 -0.195 0.091 -0.059 -0.082 -0.010 
           
 
NCI 
Center 
Public 
Institution 
Ivy League 
 
North East 
 
California 
 
Great 
Lakes     
           
NCI Center 1.000          
Public Institution -0.108 1.000         
Ivy League 0.175 -0.376 1.000        
North East 0.213 -0.511 0.480 1.000       
California 0.167 0.123 -0.174 -0.363 1.000      
Great Lakes -0.121 -0.105 -0.107 -0.224 -0.139 1.000     
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Figure 3.5 compares the likelihood of scientist commercialization between the two 
modes of commercialization — startup and licensing — for those 54 scientists perceiving 
they were helped by their TTO offices and the 47 scientist perceiving they were not helped. 
The likelihood of licensing intellectual property is greater for scientists helped by the TTO 
than for those not helped. By contrast, the likelihood of starting a new firm is less for those 
scientists helped by the TTO than for those scientists not helped. This results in a 
difference for not being helped by the TTO that is positive for startups but negative for 
licensing. 
Figure 3.5: TTO Helpfulness to Scientist by Commercialization Mode 
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Similarly, Figure 3.6 compares the likelihood of scientist commercialization 
between startups and licensing for the 111 scientists choosing the TTO route to 
commercialize their research, and the 29 scientists selecting the entrepreneurial route to 
commercialization. The likelihood of licensing intellectual property is greater for the 
scientists assigning all of their patents to their TTO. By contrast, the likelihood of starting 
a new firm is greater for those scientists not assigning all of their patents to their TTO. 
Thus, those scientists selecting the TTO commercialization route have a higher propensity 
to license, while those scientists choosing the entrepreneurial route to commercialziation 
have a higher propensity to start a new firm. 
Figure 3.6: Scientist Commercialization Route by Commercialization Mode 
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Figure 3.7 shows how one of the measures of social capital, co-publication with a 
scientist in industry, impacts the commercialization mode. Scientists with social capital, 
measured as having at least one co-publication with industry (N=88), exhibit a higher 
propensity to start a new firm, license their intellectual property, and commercialize their 
research, than do their colleagues with low social capital (N=54). Thus, there is at least 
some evidence suggesting that the impact of social capital on entrepreneurship is greater 
than on licensing.  
Figure 3.7: Social Capital by Commercialization Mode 
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The results from estimating the probit model using the mode of scientist 
commercialization as starting a new firm are provided in Table 5. Because of 
multicollinearity, not all of the control variables could be included in the same estimation 
model.  
Table 3.8: Probit Regression Results Estimating Scientist Commercialization - Startups 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Co-patents 0.141 0.155 0.155 0.191 
  (1.76)* (1.65)* (1.67)* (1.77)* 
Industry Co-publications 0.102 0.17 0.158 0.191 
  (1.72)* (1.77)* (1.72)* (1.84)* 
Board 1.696 1.663 1.721 2.204 
  (3.40)*** (2.44)** (2.55)** (2.43)** 
TTO Helpful -1.319 -1.665 -1.646 -1.602 
  (2.65)*** (2.50)** (2.53)** (2.23)** 
Government Funding 0.892 1.328 1.298 1.602 
  (1.91)* (2.13)** (2.13)** (2.14)** 
Non TTO Patent Assignee - - - 1.598 
        (1.80)* 
Asia Co-publications -1.304 -0.899 -0.733 -0.684 
  (1.77)* (1.01) (0.88) (0.75) 
TTO Age -0.022 -0.042 -0.028 -0.042 
  (1.09) (1.23) (0.85) (1.25) 
TTO Employees -0.025 -0.022  - -0.032 
  (1.52) (0.58)   (0.78) 
TTO Licensing Commitment  -  - -0.208 - 
      (0.83)   
TTO Efficiency -0.017 0.069 0.853 -0.742 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.51) (0.50) 
NCI Grant -0.001 -0.028 -0.022 0.001 
  (0.93) (1.07) (1.03) (1.14) 
NCI Helpful 1.67 1.913 1.932 2.122 
  (3.39)*** (2.99)*** (3.06)*** (3.04)*** 
Age - -0.009 0 0.025 
    (0.25) (-0.01) (0.60) 
Gender - 1.616 1.354 1.409 
    (1.24) (1.09) (1.03) 
Scientist Citations -0.37 -0.025 -0.032 -0.029 
  (2.16)** (2.30)** (2.38)** (1.73)* 
Prior Patents -0.072 -0.078 -0.08 -0.101 
  (1.41) (1.29) (1.33) (1.46) 
NCI Center  - 0.091 -0.106 0.419 
    (0.16) (0.19) (0.64) 
Public Institution - -0.742 -1.137 -0.552 
    (0.91) (1.48) (0.65) 
Ivy League - -0.934 -1.255 -2.211 
    (0.84) (1.08) (1.38) 
North East 0.918 1.234 1.156 1.677 
  (1.99)** (1.57) (1.52) (1.76)* 
California  - -0.053 -0.591 0.113 
    (0.05) (0.75) (0.09) 
Great Lakes  - -0.095 -0.468 0.210 
    (0.07) (0.36) (0.17) 
Constant 42.081 79.973 53.664 78.756 
  (1.04) (1.19) (0.81) (1.17) 
LR chi2 44.26*** 46.9*** 47.26*** 51*** 
R-squared adjusted 0.42 0.48 0.48 0.52 
Observations 83 76 76 76 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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The first column provides results where the scientist-specific characteristics of age 
and gender, and the binary variables reflecting institution type and location are not 
included in the estimation. The estimated coefficient of all three measures of social capital, 
co-patents, co-publications and serving as a member of an industry board are positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that for these three measures reflecting different 
dimensions of social capital, a greater degree of linkages and interactions, both with other 
academic scientists, with scientists in industry, and with industrial firms, tends to be 
conducive to scientist entrepreneurship. 
While engaging in co-publications increases the likelihood of a scientist becoming 
an entrepreneur, there is at least some evidence suggesting that this measure of social 
capital may not be homogenous but rather sensitive to the location of the co-author. As the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient suggests, if the co-author is located in 
Asia, the propensity of a scientist to become an entrepreneur becomes lower. Thus, there is 
at least some evidence suggesting that measures of social capital may be highly nuanced 
and heterogeneous. 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of TTO Helpful suggests that 
the likelihood of starting a business is lower for those scientists indicating that the TTO at 
their university was helpful in commercializing their research, but higher for their 
counterparts indicating that their TTO was not helpful in commercializing research. Thus, 
if the scientist perceives the TTO as not being helpful with commercialization activities, 
the likelihood of starting a firm is greater. 
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Additional funding from (non-NCI) government agencies is conducive to scientist 
entrepreneurship, as reflected by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
Government Funding. None of the measures reflecting either TTO-specific characteristics 
or the amount of the NCI grant can be considered to be statistically significant. However, 
as the positive and statistically significant coefficient suggests, those scientists indicating 
that the NCI grant was helpful have a greater propensity to become an entrepreneur. 
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of scientist citations suggests 
that more highly cited scientists have a systematically lower propensity to become 
entrepreneurs. Similarly, while prior patenting has no significant influence on scientist 
entrepreneurial behaviour, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the binary 
variable for scientists at universities located in the North East suggests that those scientists 
located between Washington, D.C. and Maine tend to be more entrepreneurial. 
In the second column, probit regression results estimating the likelihood of scientist 
startups are presented, where the scientist-specific characteristics of age and gender are 
included along with the measures of university type. Inclusion of these additional control 
variables leaves the main results reflecting the positive impact of the three measures 
reflecting social capital and the negative impact of a helpful TTO on the likelihood of 
scientist entrepreneurship virtually unchanged. The main difference in the results is that the 
location of a co-author in Asia and the Northeast dummy variable are no longer statistically 
significant. In the third column the measure reflecting the TTO commitment to licensing is 
substituted for the number of TTO licensing employees. Again, the main results remain the 
same.  
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The binary measure reflecting the route to commercialization, measured as patents 
not assigned to the TTO, is included in the probit model presented in the fourth column. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of Non TTO Patent Assignee suggests 
that those scientists choosing the entrepreneurial commercialization route, that is not 
through the TTO, have a higher likelihood of starting a new firm. Those scientists selecting 
the TTO commercialization route have a lower propensity to start a new firm. All of the 
other coefficients remain virtually unchanged. 
Thus, the results estimating the likelihood of an NCI scientist starting a firm 
provide consistent and compelling evidence that social capital promotes scientist 
entrepreneurship, while having a helpful TTO and assigning the patent to the TTO are 
associated with a lower propensity for scientists to become entrepreneurs. These results 
might suggest that starting a new firm is a prevalent mechanism for scientists resorting to 
commercializing their research through the entrepreneurial commercialization route and 
the TTO route to commercialization. 
A different mode of commercializing is licensing, and is examined in Table 6, 
which reports probit results from estimating the likelihood of scientists licensing their 
intellectual property. The coefficient of the social capital measuring co-publications cannot 
be considered to be statistically different from zero. However, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the binary variable for scientists belonging to either a Scientific 
Board of Advisors (SAB), or Board of Directors of a private firm and co-patenting does 
provide at least some evidence suggesting that social capital promotes the likelihood of a 
scientist licensing her intellectual property. 
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Table 3.9: Probit Regression Results Estimating Scientist Commercialization - License 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Co-patents 0.154 0.400 0.388 0.470 
  (1.25) (2.25)** (2.20)** (2.51)** 
Industry Co-publications 0.025 0.068 0.072 0.092 
  (0.64) (1.02) (1.12) (1.19) 
Board 1.123 1.965 1.946 2.279 
  (2.99)*** (3.16)*** (3.19)*** (3.17)*** 
TTO Helpful 0.769 1.261 1.264 1.413 
  (2.16)** (2.45)** (2.45)** (2.45)** 
Government Funding 0.681 0.883 0.873 1.346 
  (1.90)* (1.78)* (1.76)* (2.21)** 
Non TTO Patent Assignee - - - -2.978 
        (2.54)** 
Asia Industry Co-publications 1.343 2.165 2.223 2.497 
  (1.72)* (1.62) (1.67)* (1.42) 
NCI Helpful 0.277 0.565 0.554 0.478 
  (0.78) (1.15) (1.14) (0.91) 
TTO Age 0.025 -0.004 0.001 0.001 
  (1.58) (0.15) (0.01) (0.02) 
TTO Employees 0.004 -0.015 - 0.006 
  (0.22) (0.43)   (0.16) 
TTO Licensing Commitment - - 0.019 - 
      (0.12)  
TTO Efficiency 2.281 2.744 2.932 4.300 
  (2.25)** (1.95)* (1.90)* (2.42)** 
NCI Grant 0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.14) (2.50)** (2.51)** (2.58)*** 
Scientist Age - -0.014 -0.01 -0.045 
    (0.40) (0.30) (1.13) 
Gender - -2.173 -2.134 -2.505 
    (2.42)** (2.40)** (2.48)** 
Scientist Citations -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.010 
  (0.24) (0.30) (0.320) (0.66) 
Prior Patents -0.02 -0.01 -0.013 -0.006 
  (0.47) (0.18) (0.23) (0.11) 
NCI Center  - 0.033 -0.047 -0.691 
    (0.06) (0.09) (1.04) 
Public Institution - 0.685 0.476 0.111 
    (0.87) (0.74) (0.12) 
Ivy League - 0.329 0.243 1.175 
    (0.38) (0.26) (0.97) 
North East 0.416 0.448 0.325 -0.076 
  (1.08) (0.60) (0.48) (0.08) 
California  - -0.26 -0.636) -1.301 
    (0.24) (0.92) (0.97) 
0.072 Great Lakes  
  
- 
  
1.002 
(0.93) 
0.885 
(0.83) (0.06) 
Constant 51.347 7.189 -0.201 0.584 
  (1.65)* (0.14) (0.00) (0.01) 
LR chi2 31.76*** 44.02*** 43.84*** 54*** 
R-squared adjusted 0.28 0.42 0.42 0.52 
Observations 83 76 76 76 
 Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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As for the commercialization mode of startups, the coefficient of the TTO being 
helpful with scientist commercialization is statistically significant. However, the sign of 
the coefficient is actually the opposite, i.e. positive, suggesting that those scientists who 
indicate that they are helped by the TTO have a higher propensity to license their 
intellectual property, which is in stark contrast to the findings in Table 6 indicating a lower 
propensity to become an entrepreneur. This might suggest an asymmetric effect of TTOs 
on scientist entrepreneurship versus scientist licensing. The TTOs appear to be more 
helpful to a scientist in licensing their intellectual property than for starting a new firm. 
While the positive and statistically significant coefficient of Government Funding 
is similar to that found for the mode of startups, the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of the variable measuring co-publications with an industry co-author located in 
Asia is the opposite. This might indicate that while having a co-author located in Asia 
reduces the likelihood of starting a firm it actually increases the propensity for U.S. based 
scientists to license their intellectual property. 
The coefficients of the variables measuring the helpfulness of the NCI Grant 
towards commercialization, TTO Age, and number of TTO employees are not statistically 
significant. However, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of TTO Efficiency 
indicates that those scientists located at a university where the TTO is more efficient 
exhibit a higher likelihood of licensing their intellectual property. None of the remaining 
variables, Scientist Citations, Prior Patents, or Northeast, are found to have statistically 
significant impact on the likelihood of scientist licensing. 
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The second column reports regression results where measures reflecting scientist 
age, gender, and university type and location are included in the estimation model. There 
are three main differences. First, the coefficient of Co-patents becomes statistically 
significant and positive, indicating that, for the entrepreneurship mode of 
commercialization, this dimension of social capital is positively related to the likelihood of 
licensing intellectual property. 
Second, the coefficient of NCI Grant becomes negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the higher the NCI grant award, the lower is the likelihood of a scientist 
licensing their intellectual property. Finally, the coefficient of Gender is negative and 
statistically significant. The negative coefficient of this binary variable may seem 
surprising, given that a slightly higher share of male scientists license their intellectual 
property than do their female colleagues.18 However, one interpretation of the negative 
coefficient is that if female scientists had the same degree of co-patenting with other 
scientists, participation on boards, help from the TTO, additional funding from non-NCI 
government agencies, and level of efficiency at their universities’ TTO, they would 
actually exhibit a higher propensity to license than do their male colleagues. According to 
this interpretation, what explains the gender gap, in terms of licensing behaviour, is not 
gender per se, but rather access to and participation in social capital, such as sitting on 
scientific advisory boards and boards of directors, as well as co-patenting with other 
academic scientists. The measure of TTO Licensing Commitment is substituted for TTO 
Employees in the regression results presented in the third column. The results remain 
virtually identical to those reported in column two.  
                                                 
18 51 percent of the patenting male scientists licensed their intellectual property and 49 percent of the 
patenting female scientists licensed their intellectual property. 
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The measure reflecting the scientist commercialization route is included in the 
fourth column. As the negative and statistically significant coefficient of Non TTO Patent 
Assignee suggests, those scientists choosing the entrepreneurial route to commercialize 
their research exhibit a lower likelihood of licensing their intellectual property. In 
comparison, those scientists selecting the TTO commercialization route have a higher 
propensity to license. 
Overall, the results reported from estimating scientist licensing reveal several 
striking similarities but also differences from those estimating scientist entrepreneurship. 
First, the impact of social capital is positive for both entrepreneurship and licensing. Co-
patenting with other academic scientists as well as sitting on a scientific advisory board or 
board of directors of a private company increases the likelihood of a scientist both starting 
a business and licensing her intellectual property. However, co-publishing with scientists 
in industry spurs scientist entrepreneurship, while it has no impact on licensing behaviour.  
Second, scientist perception that the TTO is helpful in commercializing research 
leads to disparate results between the two modes of commercialization. While those 
scientists indicating that the TTO was helpful exhibited a higher propensity to license their 
intellectual property, they also were less entrepreneurial in that they have a lower 
likelihood to start a new firm. However, those scientists indicating that the TTO was not 
helpful were less likely to license their intellectual property, but had a higher propensity to 
start a new business. This is also consistent with the finding that TTO efficiency promotes 
scientist licensing but not entrepreneurship. These disparate findings may suggest that the 
impact of the TTOs is not symmetric across difference modes of commercialization.  
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Third, the particular commercialization route chosen by the scientist influences the 
mode of commercialization. Those scientists choosing the TTO commercialization route 
exhibit a higher likelihood of licensing but a lower propensity to start a new firm. By 
contrast, scientists choosing the entrepreneurship route to commercialize their research 
have a greater propensity to start new firms rather than license their intellectual property. 
Entrepreneurship in the form of a new firm startup apparently serves as a substitute for 
licensing when scientist commercialization is through the entrepreneurial route and not the 
TTO route. 
In Table 7 the two modes of commercialization, entrepreneurship and licensing, are 
combined to identify the likelihood of a scientist commercializing her research. There is at 
least some evidence suggesting that social capital promotes scientist commercialization. 
While co-patenting with other academic scientists seems to have no significant impact on 
commercialization behaviour, both co-publishing with an industry scientist and sitting on a 
board of a firm are found to increase the likelihood that a scientist commercializes her 
research. 
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Table 3.10: Probit Regression Results Estimating Scientist Commercialization - 
Commercialize 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Co-patents 0.097 0.272 0.152 0.306 
  (1.17) (1.46) (0.96) (1.59) 
Industry Co-publications 0.140 0.206 0.191 0.215 
  (2.11)** (2.00)** (2.13)** (2.00)** 
Board 1.335 1.532 1.586 1.496 
  (3.25)*** (2.76)*** (2.93)*** (2.62)*** 
TTO Helpful 0.571 0.552 0.706 0.503 
  (1.43) (1.00) (1.34) (0.90) 
Government Funding 0.910 0.936 0.904 0.768 
  (2.14)** (1.87)* (1.85)* (1.46) 
Non TTO Patent Assignee - - - 0.922 
        (1.03) 
NCI Helpful 0.907 1.433 1.140 1.393 
  (2.26)** (2.44)** (2.26)** (2.30)** 
TTO Age 0.021 -0.016 0.009 -0.018 
  (1.26) (0.50) (0.30) (0.57) 
TTO Employees -0.017 -0.066 - -0.073 
  (0.92) (1.45)   (1.53) 
TTO Licensing Commitment - - -0.298 -  
      (1.67)*   
TTO Efficiency 0.970 0.712 1.827 0.916 
  (0.90) (0.54) (1.15) (0.66) 
NCI Grant 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.64) (1.46) (1.32) (1.47) 
Scientist Age 0.002 -0.043 -0.031 -0.049 
  (0.65) (1.22) (0.94) (1.33) 
Previous Patents -0.018 -0.913 -0.552 -0.943 
  (0.41) (1.05) (0.70) (1.06) 
Citations - 0.010 0.020 0.012 
    (1.38) (1.06) (1.47) 
Previous Patents - 0.001 -0.011 0.015 
    (0.02) (0.21) (0.25) 
NCI Center  - -0.005 -0.167 0.070 
    (0.01) (0.32) (0.12) 
Public Institution - 0.053 -0.717 0.125 
    (0.07) (1.11) (0.17) 
North East 0.881 1.234 0.821 1.303 
  (2.20)** (1.71)* (1.34) (1.77)* 
California  - 1.095 -0.714 1.352 
    (0.82) (1.01) (0.97) 
Great Lakes  - 0.705 -0.165 0.536 
    (0.54) (0.13) (0.37) 
Constant -44.366 32.443 -16.937 37.238 
  (1.31) (0.52) (0.28) (0.59) 
LR chi2 39.22*** 44.87*** 45.30*** 46.06*** 
R-squared adjusted 0.37 0.46 0.46 0.47 
Observations 83 76 76 76 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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There is no statistically significant evidence that being at a university where the 
scientist indicates that the TTO is helpful with commercialization efforts actually impacts 
the likelihood of that scientist commercializing. However, the results do suggest that 
additional funding from non-NCI government agencies, as well as the NCI grant itself 
increases the propensity of scientists to commercialize their research. 
Since the measure of scientist commercialization combines two modes of 
commercialization, entrepreneurship and licensing, it may not be surprising that the results 
generally reflect a combination of the individual findings for startups and licensing.  
It is also possible to provide a comparison between the two modes of 
commercialization and patenting behaviour. However, since the survey was administered 
to the 140 respondents from the 392 NCI scientists who had patented, it is not possible to 
apply the variables formed from the survey instrument to the larger sample of 1,431 NCI 
scientists.  The results from estimating the likelihood of a scientist patenting are reported in 
Table 8. As the positive and statistically significant coefficients of Co-publications 
indicate, there is evidence suggesting that measures of social capital increase the scientist 
propensity to patent as well as license and become an entrepreneur. Furthermore, the 
location of the co-author apparently influences the propensity to patent. If the co-author is 
located in Asia, the likelihood of a U.S. based scientist patenting in the U.S. is greater. 
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Table 3.11: Probit Regression Results Estimating Scientist Commercialization - Patents 
 
  1 2 3 
Co-publications 0.061 0.043 0.055 
  (5.82)*** (3.45)*** (5.06)*** 
Asia Co-publications 0.269 0.228 0.222 
  (3.47)*** (2.64)*** (2.78)*** 
0.042 -0.006 0.039 TTO Employees 
 (1.75)* (-1.00) (-1.51) 
TTO Efficiency 1.006 0.894 0.867 
  (3.23)*** (2.41)** (2.60)*** 
TTO Age -0.015 -0.004 -0.010 
  (3.40)*** (0.76) (2.14)** 
Scientist Citations -  0.045 0.022 
    (0.33) (1.45) 
NCI Grant -  0.007 0.004 
    (0.55) (0.36) 
Gender -  0.245 0.397 
    (2.30)** (3.95)*** 
Public Institution -  -0.129 -0.175 
    (1.24) (1.94)* 
NCI Center  -  0.021 0.018 
    (0.24) (0.22) 
Ivy League -  -0.082 0.042 
    (0.53) (0.30) 
North East -  0.013 0.087 
    (0.11) (0.79) 
California  -  0.262 0.154 
    (1.25) (1.31) 
Great Lakes  -  0.048 0.064 
    (0.35) (0.50) 
Previous Patents -  0.230 -  
    (12.14)***   
Constant 27.50 6.343 19.142 
  (3.25)*** (0.60) (1.98)** 
Observations 1431 1431 1431 
LR chi2 83.75*** 341.44*** 112.65*** 
R-squared adjusted 0.05 0.22 0.07 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The other consistent result involves TTO Efficiency. Those scientists working at 
universities with a more efficient TTO exhibit a higher propensity to patent. There is also 
at least some evidence suggesting that older and more established TTOs and larger TTOs, 
as measured by employment, tend to be associated with a higher scientist propensity to 
patent.  
Because the samples of scientists are not the same, comparisons across these 
different commercialization modes must be qualified and considered to be provisional at 
best. Still, there are at least some indications suggesting that social capital promotes all 
modes of commercialization, but perhaps entrepreneurship the strongest. By contrast, the 
TTO seems to be most effective in promoting first and foremost patents and then licensing, 
but much less startups. 
To further probe the impact that the TTO plays in facilitating different 
commercialization modes, the sample of survey respondents is decomposed into those 
scientists indicating that they were helped with their commercialization efforts by the TTO 
and those that were not. Based on these two sub-samples, regression results estimating the 
likelihood of a scientist licensing are reported in Table 9. Results for the sub-sample of 
scientists indicating that they were helped by the TTO are reported in the first two 
columns, while those not helped are reported in the last two columns. 
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Table 3.12: Probit Regression Results Estimating Scientist Licensing by Helpfulness of 
TTO 
 
 
 
TTO Helped Scientist 
  
 TTO Did Not Help Scientist 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Startup -2.957 - 2.507 - 
 (1.90)*  (2.13)**  
Co-patents 1.384 1.065 0.353 0.181 
 (2.22)** (2.25)** (0.62) (0.66) 
Industry Co-pubs 0.192 0.125 -0.296 -0.081 
 (1.31) (0.98) (1.65)* (0.84) 
Government Funding 4.795 1.897 -0.495 0.011 
 (2.22)** (2.19)** (0.50) (0.02) 
NCI Helpful -0.053 -0.200 2.931 2.526 
 (0.07) (0.28) (1.72)* (2.79)*** 
TTO Efficiency 4.797 3.366 4.938 2.807 
 (1.73)* (1.59) (1.41) (1.58) 
TTO Employees 0.005 0.011 -0.114 -0.068 
 (0.15) (0.33) (1.41) (1.58) 
TTO Age -0.234 -0.104 -0.046 -0.012 
 (2.34)** (1.77)* (0.67) (0.28) 
Scientist Age 0.093 0.039 -0.168 -0.093 
 (1.43) (0.86) (1.97)** (1.61) 
North East 0.682 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.84) (2.32)** (0.99) (0.62) 
Great Lakes 3.362 0.680 0.263 0.287 
 (1.92)* (0.95) (0.19) (0.31) 
NCI Grant -0.007 2.258 3.122 1.703 
 (2.35)** (1.59) (1.66)* (1.36) 
Constant 457.962 203.606 99.986 29.158 
 (2.33)** (1.75)* (0.71) (0.31) 
LR chi2 28.15** 23.27** 28.54*** 21.45** 
R-squared adjusted 0.55 0.45 0.61 0.46 
Observations 41 41 35 35 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The first column also includes a binary variable taking on the value of one if the 
scientist started a new firm. As the negative and statistically significant coefficient of this 
variable suggests, those scientists indicating they were helped by TTO and started a new 
firm exhibited a lower likelihood of licensing their intellectual property. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of this binary variable in the third column suggests that 
of those scientists not helped by the TTO, starting a firm increases the likelihood of 
licensing. Taken together, these results might suggest that for those scientists helped by the 
TTO, entrepreneurship and licensing tend to be substitutes. Scientists tend to do one or the 
other, but not both. By contrast, for those scientists not helped by the TTO, 
entrepreneurship and licensing tend to be complements. Those scientists who start a new 
business also tend to license their intellectual property. 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
A consequence of globalization in the most developed countries, such as the United 
States, has been to shift the comparative advantage away from traditional manufacturing 
industries and towards new knowledge-based economic activity. But where is this 
knowledge to come from? At this point, the answer is uncertain, but along with education 
and human capital, as well as critical research and development (R&D) by private industry 
and government agencies, research undertaken by universities is sure to play a prominent 
role. As research and knowledge become perhaps the most crucial component to 
generating economic growth and competitive jobs in globally-linked markets, universities 
emerge as a key factor in determining the future well-being of the country. After all, it 
ranks among the most important tasks of universities to create new scientific knowledge. 
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In addition, the magnitude of resources being invested in university research, including 
some of the most capable and creative scientists in the country, is the envy of the world. 
The massive investment in university research can impact economic growth only if 
knowledge can be transformed into actual innovations and new and better products through 
the commercialization process. That is, the extent to which university research becomes 
commercialized. It matters for economic growth, for jobs and for global competitiveness. 
Thus, a large literature has emerged trying to gauge and analyze the extent to which 
university research spills over into commercial activity. Much, if not most, of this previous 
research has been restricted to focusing on the activities emanating from Technology 
Transfer Offices, which have provided systematic and consistent documentation of their 
efforts over a fairly long period of time. Analyses of these data have typically led to 
conclusions suggesting that while patents and licenses from university research have 
increased over time, the typical TTO does not generate significant commercialization of 
university research. However, an important qualification is that, by restricting themselves 
to TTO generated data, such studies are not able to consider any commercialization 
activities not emanating from the TTOs. 
This chapter has taken a different approach. Rather than focus on what the TTOs 
do, it instead focuses on what university scientists do. Thus, the findings about the 
commercialization of university research are based on actual university scientists and not 
the TTOs. The results are revealing. In particular, while all modes of commercialization 
are important, scientist entrepreneurship emerges as an important and prevalent mode of 
commercialization of university research. More than one in four patenting NCI scientists 
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has started a new firm. This is a remarkably high rate of entrepreneurship for any group of 
people, let alone university scientists. Thus, the extent to which university research is 
being commercialized and entering the market may be significantly greater than might 
have been inferred from studies restricted only to the commercialization activities of the 
TTO. Scientist entrepreneurship may prove to be the sleeping giant of university 
commercialization. 
Second, the mode of commercialization is apparently not independent of the 
commercialization route. Nearly one-third of patenting NCI scientists rely on the 
entrepreneurial commercialization route, in that they do not assign all of their patents to the 
university. These scientists exhibit a higher likelihood of starting a new firm but a lower 
propensity to license. By contrast, scientists choosing the TTO commercialization route 
exhibit a higher propensity to license but a lower likelihood to start a new firm.  
Third, we find that the determinants of scientist commercialization vary 
considerably according to the specific mode of commercialization. Social capital, 
measured in terms of co-patenting with other NCI scientists, co-publishing with industry 
scientists, and sitting on a scientific advisory board (SAB) or board of directors, generally 
promotes all modes of commercialization, although the impact seems to be the strongest 
for scientist entrepreneurship. However, the role of the TTO is sharply divided depending 
upon the commercialization mode. Having a TTO that is perceived to be helpful for 
commercialization seems to increase the likelihood of a scientist licensing but decrease the 
propensity of the scientist to start a new firm. By contrast, having a TTO that is perceived 
not to be helpful reduces the licensing activity of scientists but increases their likelihood of 
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becoming entrepreneurs. Thus, licensing and entrepreneurship appear to be substitutes 
when the TTO is helpful to the scientists and complements when not.  
How are scientists able to start a business without TTO support? There is at least 
some evidence indicating that social capital can serve as a mechanism to compensate for 
lack of TTO help when starting a new firm. This would suggest that university governance 
and public policy facilitating participation in scientific networks may be a valuable 
investment accruing positive returns in terms of knowledge spillovers and technology 
transfer, ultimately leading to commercialization, innovation and economic growth. 
Future research needs to further probe why and how scientists choose to 
commercialize their research, what commercialization route they select, what mode of 
commercialization is most effective, and how university governance and public policy can 
best promote such commercialization efforts. A host of pressing questions remain. For 
example, are all social networks equivalent, that is are they homogeneous, or do some 
facilitate scientist commercialization more than others? Similarly, do non-patenting 
scientists engage in commercialization activities, particularly entrepreneurship, or does 
their lack of patented intellectual propensity preclude commercialization of their research? 
Whatever answers to these and other crucial questions future research can uncover, the 
sleeping giant of scientist entrepreneurship may prove to be one giant that is worth waking 
up. 
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3.8 Appendix A: Breakdown of Patents by U. S. Patent and Trademark Office 
Classification 
 
Classification of Patents 
by USPTO Category 
Percentage of 
total NCI 
patents 
Title 
435 0.352% Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology 
514 0.184% Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions 
424 0.152% Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions 
530 0.060% Chemistry: natural resins or derivatives; peptides or proteins; lignins or reaction 
products  
536 0.038% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
128 0.017% Surgery 
436 0.014% Chemistry: analytical and immunological testing 
250 0.013% Radiant energy 
382 0.012% Image analysis 
600 0.011% Surgery 
800 0.010% Multicellular living organisms and unmodified parts thereof and related  
324 0.008% Electricity: measuring and testing 
549 0.008% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
604 0.006% Surgery 
548 0.006% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
364 0.005% Electric power conversion systems 
606 0.004% Surgery 
528 0.004% Synthetic resins or natural rubbers -- part of the class 520 series 
422 0.004% Chemical apparatus and process disinfecting, deodorizing, preserving, or sterilizing 
560 0.004% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
546 0.003% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
564 0.003% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
356 0.002% Optics: measuring and testing 
378 0.002% X-ray or gamma ray systems or devices 
210 0.002% Liquid purification or separation 
385 0.002% Optical waveguides 
568 0.002% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
623 0.002% Prosthesis (i.e., artificial body members), parts thereof, or aids and accessories 
therefor 
556 0.002% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
359 0.002% Optical: systems and elements 
426 0.002% Food or edible material: processes, compositions, and products 
73 0.001% Measuring and testing 
260 0.001% Chemistry of carbon compounds 
362 0.001% Illumination 
544 0.001% Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
*Note, the top 95% of the patent breakdown is shown 
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Chapter 4: Academic Entrepreneurship: The Role of Novel and General 
Heterogonous Innovation 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Perhaps triggered by passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, and the subsequent 
proliferation of technology transfer offices at universities around the world, a recent 
literature has exploded focusing on the transfer and spill over of university research 
(Shane, 2002 and Shane and Stuart, 2002). This research has typically examined what 
universities do, particularly in terms of patented inventions (Herderson, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 1998; Colyvas et al., 2002; and Thursby and Thursby, 2002). 
However, much less attention has been given to what the scientists themselves do 
themselves, in terms of commercialization, either with or without the assistance of the 
technology transfer office (TTO). As Shane (2004, p.4) points out,  “Sometimes patents, 
copyrights and other legal mechanisms are used to protect the intellectual property that 
leads to spinoffs, while at other times the intellectual property that leads to a spinoff 
company formation takes the form of know how or trade secrets. Moreover, sometimes 
entrepreneurs create university spinoffs by licensing university inventions, while at other 
times the spinoffs are created without the intellectual property being formally licensed 
from the institution in which it was created. These distinctions are important for two 
reasons. First it is harder for researchers to measure the formation of spinoff companies 
created to exploit intellectual property that is not protected by legal mechanisms or that 
has not been disclosed by inventors to university administrators.” 
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The few studies that have analyzed the commercialization activities of scientists 
have focused on characteristics specific to the scientists, such as age and gender (Stephan 
and Levin 1991 and Audretsch and Stephan, 1996), as well as the scientist’s human 
capital (measured in terms of publications and citations) (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 
1998; Audretsch and Stephan, 1996) and social capital. In addition, several studies have 
considered the impact of the technology transfer office on the propensity for scientists to 
become an entrepreneur ( Feldman et al. 2002, Zucker et al. 2002 ).  These studies 
generally find that a higher degree of human capital, or scientist knowledge, as measured 
in terms of publications and citations, leads to a higher propensity to commercialize that 
knowledge in the form of a patented invention of becoming an entrepreneur. 
However, a very different literature suggests that the knowledge underlying a 
patented invention may not be homogenous in nature. Rather, Trajtenberg, Jaffe and 
Henderson (1997) and Agarwal and Henderson (2002) suggest that knowledge is 
remarkably heterogeneous. They introduce a method for distinguishing between and 
measuring the extent to which knowledge reflects originality or novelty, rather than being 
incremental in nature. Similarly, they are able to distinguish between knowledge that is 
general versus specific knowledge.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the type of knowledge 
underling a scientist’s patent, rather than the more traditional measures reflecting 
characteristics specific to the scientist, influences the likelihood that she will become an 
entrepreneur. In particular, this chapter links to characteristics of a scientist’s patents, 
novelty and generality, to the propensity that scientist will become an entrepreneur. 
Based on a large data set of scientists awarded a research grant from the National Cancer 
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Institute (NCI) and holding patents, this chapter finds that scientist holding a patent that 
is more original and general have a higher likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur that 
those with a patent that reflects incremental knowledge and specific knowledge. Thus, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the type of knowledge underlying a patent may 
influence the decision for a scientist to become an entrepreneur, rather than 
characteristics specific to the entrepreneur found in previous literature.  
 
4.2 Scientist Entrepreneurship 
 
The focus of the growing literature on scientist entrepreneurship has been to 
address the question of why some scientists choose to become entrepreneurs while others 
do not. In seeking an answer, studies have generally focused on five factors. The first 
factor is the amount of knowledge or human capital associated with the scientist. If new 
knowledge drives new commercial opportunities, then scientists with more knowledge 
should have a greater propensity to become an entrepreneur. In an important study, 
Zucker et al. (2002) find that startup activity tends to be greater where star scientists, 
measured in terms of scientific output, is greater. 
The second factor influencing the decision by scientists to become an entrepreneur 
involves the social capital accessed by the capital or linkages to important networks. Social capital 
refers to meaningful interactions and linkages the scientist has with others. While physical capital 
refers to the importance of machines and tools as a factor of production (Solow, 1956), the 
endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 1990; Lucas 1988) puts the emphasis on the process of 
knowledge accumulation, and hence the creation of knowledge capital. The concept of social 
capital (Putnam, 1993 and Coleman, 1988) can be considered a further extension because it adds a 
social component to those factors shaping economic growth and prosperity. According to Putnam 
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(2000, p.19), “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the 
properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks. 
By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital – tools and training that enhance 
individual productivity – social capital refers to features of social organization, such as networks 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits.” 
A large and robust literature has emerged attempting to link social capital to 
entrepreneurship (Aldrich and Martinez, 2003; Aldrich, 2005; and Thorton and Flynn, 
2003). According to this literature, entrepreneurial activity should be enhanced where 
investments in social capital are greater. Interactions and linkages, such as working 
together with industry, are posited as conduits not just of knowledge spillovers but also for 
the demonstration effect providing a flow of information across scientists about how 
scientific research can be commercialized (Thursby and Thursby, 2004).  
Nicolaou and Birley (2003) examine the influences of social networks on university 
spin-outs. Their data base consists of 45 spin- outs comprising 111 inventors originating 
from Imperial College London. They find that a high level of non redundancy in the 
academic’s institutional business discussion networks, coupled with a high strength of ties, 
increases the propensity for a scientist to become an entrepreneur. 
Rappert et al. (1999) find empirical evidence supporting the importance of 
linkages with industry for academic entrepreneurs. Based on detailed interviews with 94  
individuals from 59 university spin-offs in the United Kingdom, they find that linkages 
play a crucial role. Similarly, Murray (2004), using data from 23 U.S. biotechnology 
firms, finds that the academic inventors’ social capital contributes to entrepreneurial 
capabilities. In analyzing the impact of star scientists on the success of biotechnology in 
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Japan, Zucker and Darby (2001) identify collaboration between the scientists and 
industry plays an important role. Based on a survey of 291 university scientists involved 
in biotechnology in Isreal, Oliver (2004) finds that scientists with significantly more 
industrial collaborations were more likely to submit patent applications. Thus, there are 
both compelling theoretical reasons as well as supporting empirical evidence linking 
social capital to scientist entrepreneurship. 
The third factor influencing the decision to become an entrepreneur by a scientist 
is the institutional context in which she works. One of the important mechanisms 
facilitating the entrepreneurial activities of universities is the technology office of the 
university (TTO), which has a mandate to facilitate and promote the commercialization 
of university science. As the President of the Association of American Universities 
observed, “Before Bayh-Dole, the federal government had accumulated 30,000 patents, 
of which only 5% had been licensed and even fewer had found their way into commercial 
products. Today under Bayh-Dole more than 200 universities are engaged in technology 
transfer, adding more than $21 billion each year to the economy,”19 and the Commission 
of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office claimed, “In the 1970s, the government 
discovered that inventions that resulted from public funding were not reaching the 
marketplace because no one could make the additional investment to turn basic research 
into marketable products. That finding resulted in the Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 1980. It 
enabled universities, small companies, and nonprofit organizations to commercialize the 
results of federally funded research. The results of Bayh-Dole have been significant. 
                                                 
19 cited in Mowery (2005, p. 2). 
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Before 1981, fewer than 250 patents were issued to universities each year. A decade later 
universities were averaging approximately 1,000 patents a year.”20 
Research has found that the TTO influences entrepreneurial activities emanating 
from university scientists. For example, Leitch and Harrrison (2005) undertook a series of 
interviews with the directors of TTOs and found that the TTO can influence start-up 
ventures. Link and Scott (2005) found that the proximity of the university to a research 
park facilitates the ability of a TTO to generate spinoffs. Jensen and Thursby (2001) 
examined 62 TTOs at U.S. universities and concluded that the ability of the TTO to 
license inventions increases the speed to which intellectual property becomes 
commercialized. Markman et al. (2004) interviewed 128 TTO directors and found a link 
between the compensation of TTO personnel and entrepreneurial activity generated by 
the TTO. 
The fourth factor influencing scientist entrepreneurship involves characteristics 
specific to the particular scientist, in particular age. The university or academic career 
trajectory encourages and rewards the production of new scientific knowledge. Thus, the 
goal of the scientist in the university context is to establish priority. This is done most 
efficiently through publication in scientific journals (Audretsch and Stephan, 2000). By 
contrast, with a career trajectory in the private sector, scientists are rewarded for the 
production of new economic knowledge, or knowledge which has been commercialized 
in the market, but not necessarily new scientific knowledge per se. In fact, scientists 
working in industry are often discouraged from sharing knowledge externally with the 
                                                 
20 cited in Mowery (2005, p. 2) 
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scientific community through publication. As a result of these differential incentive 
structures, industrial and academic scientists develop distinct career trajectories. 
The appropriability question confronting academic scientists can be considered in 
the context of the model of scientist human capital over the life-cycle. Scientist life-cycle 
models suggest that early in their careers scientists invest heavily in human capital in 
order to build a scientific reputation (Levin and Stephan, 1991). In the later stages of their 
career, the scientist trades or cashes in this reputation for economic return. Thus, early in 
her career, the scientist invests in the creation of scientific knowledge in order to 
establish a reputation that signals the value of that knowledge to the scientific 
community.  
With maturity, scientists seek ways to appropriate the economic value of the new 
knowledge. Thus, academic scientists may seek to commercialize their scientific research 
within a life-cycle context. The life-cycle model of the scientist implies that, ceteris 
paribus, scientist age should play a role in the decision to commercialize. In the early 
stages of her career, a scientist will tend to invest in her scientific reputation. As she 
evolves towards maturity and the marginal productivity of her scientific research starts to 
hit diminishing returns, the incentive for cashing in through commercialization becomes 
greater. 
Scientists working in the private sector are arguably more fully compensated for 
the economic value of their knowledge. This will not be the case for academic scientists, 
unless they cash out, in terms of Dasgupta and David (1994), by commercializing their 
scientific knowledge. This suggests that academic scientists seek commercialization 
 79
within a life-cycle context, where they are more likely to enter into entrepreneurship as 
they mature. 
The fifth factor influencing scientist entrepreneurship is geography. Scientist 
location can influence the decision to commercialize for two reasons. First, as Jaffe 
(1989), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), and 
Glaeser, Kallal, Sheinkman and Shleifer (2002) show, knowledge tends to spill over 
within geographically bounded regions. This implies that scientists working in regions 
with a high level of investments in new knowledge can more easily access and generate 
new scientific ideas. This suggests that scientists working in knowledge clusters should 
tend to be more productive than their counterparts who are geographically isolated. As 
Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992, p. 1126) have observed, “Intellectual 
breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and continents.” 
A second component of externalities involves not the technological knowledge, 
but rather behavioural knowledge. As Bercoviz and Feldman (2004) show for a study 
based on the commercialization activities of scientists at Johns Hopkins and Duke 
University, the likelihood of a scientist engaging in commercialization activity, which is 
measured as disclosing an invention, is shaped based on the commercialization behaviour 
of the doctoral supervisor in the institution where the scientist was trained, as well as the 
commercialization behaviour and attitudes exhibited by the chair and peers at the relevant 
department. Similarly, based on a study of 778 faculty members from 40 universities, 
Louis et al. (1989) find that it is the local norms of behaviour and attitudes towards 
commercialization that shape the likelihood of an individual university scientist to engage 
in commercialization activity, in their case by starting a new firm. 
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Audretsch and Stephan (1996) find that geography matters more in certain 
economic relationships than in others. In particular, from a data set of 54 beiotechnology 
firms affiliated with 445 university scientists, they find that the probability of a scientist- 
firm contact being local is shaped by the role played by the scientists: (i) Proximity 
matters more in the case of founders and chairs of scientific advisory board (SABs); (ii) 
Proximity does not matter as much in the case of members of SABs; (iii) When 
knowledge is transmitted through formal ties, geographic proximity is not necessary. 
Zucker et al. (1998) examine 327 star sciences in the life sciences and 751 U.S. firms and 
find that the location of new dedicated biotechnology firms and new biotech subunits of 
existing firms are primarily explained by the presence of academic star scientists. Thus, 
the locational context can influence the propensity for scientists to engage in 
commercialization activities by providing access to spatially bounded knowledge 
spillovers and by shaping the behavioural norms and attitudes towards entrepreneurship. 
While extant research has identified these five factors – human capital, social 
capital, institutional context, age and geography – the impact of the type of knowledge 
associated with the scientist on entrepreneurship has largely been neglected. Even though 
the first factor considers the amount of knowledge, it typically is measured in terms of the 
quantity of publications and citations and is therefore considered to be homogeneous. In 
the next section we will suggest that, in fact, knowledge emerging from scientific 
research is remarkably heterogeneous in such a manner as to influence the decision of 
scientists to become an entrepreneur. 
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4.3 Novelty and Generality 
 
The previous section identified a growing literature suggesting that the knowledge 
embodied in a scientist is an in important factor influencing the likelihood of her 
becoming an entrepreneur. In particular, the degree to which the knowledge is novel 
versus incremental should influence the decision to become an entrepreneur in order to 
commercialize that knowledge. Knowledge that is more incremental in nature can be 
characterized more by risk, where the outcomes are known along with their associated 
probability distributions. By contrast, knowledge that is novel is characterized more by 
uncertainty where not only are the outcomes not known but no associated probability 
distributions can be assigned (Alvarez, 2003, Barney, 1986 and Alvarez and Barney, 
2005 and 2006).  
The cost of the scientist transferring incremental knowledge through a license or 
consulting contract is relatively low because the associated risk can be calculated and 
incorporated into the contract. By contrast, it is very difficult for a scientist to transfer 
novel knowledge through the standard instruments of licensing or consulting because of 
the inherent uncertainty which cannot be written into a contract. Thus, as Alvarez (2003), 
Barney (1986) and Alvarez and Barney (2005 and 2006) point out, entrepreneurial 
opportunities tend to be more highly associated with knowledge characterized by 
uncertainty rather than risk, or in this case novel knowledge rather than incremental 
knowledge. 
Arrow (1962) and Williamson (1975) argued that when knowledge created 
outside of incumbent firms cannot be easily transferred to those incumbent firms, as a 
result of agency and bureaucracy problems, the holder of such knowledge is not able to 
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transfer that knowledge via a licensing or consulting contract but must rather start her 
own firm in order to appropriate the expected returns on that knowledge. This reflects 
what Winter (1984, p. 297) termed as an entrepreneurial technological regime where, 
“An entrepreneurial regime is one that is favorable to innovative entry and unfavorable to 
innovative activity by established firms.”  
Winter’s (1982) entrepreneurial regime corresponds to Alvarez and Barney’s 
(2007) high uncertainty context associated with novel knowledge. This would suggest 
that scientists with knowledge that can be characterized as being relatively novel rather 
than incremental would more likely choose to become entrepreneurs. 
Similarly, knowledge that is more general in nature and less specific to a 
particular application is also characterized by a greater degree of uncertainty. It is very 
difficult for a scientist to know all of the ways in which general knowledge can be 
applied and commercialized. Thus, general knowledge would also be expected to be more 
conducive to entrepreneurship than would very specific knowledge. This leads to the 
hypotheses that the likelihood of a scientist becoming an entrepreneur should be higher if 
she holds patents reflecting more novel knowledge as well as more general knowledge. 
 
4.4 Measurement Issues 
 
In order to link the propensity for a scientist to become an entrepreneur to the 
nature of her underlying intellectual property, a new data base was created based on 
scientists awarded a research grant by the National Cancer Institute between 1998 and 
2002. Of those research grant awards, the largest twenty percent, which included 1,693 
scientist awardees, were taken to form the database used in this chapter. The National 
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Cancer Institute (NCI) awarded a total of $5,350,977,742 to the top 1,693 scientists in the 
United States from 1998 to 2002.  
To match the patent records with the 1,692 NCI recipient scientists, Structured 
Query Language (SQL) and Python programming languages were written to extract and 
manipulate data. A match between the patentee and NCI awardee databases was 
considered to be positive if all four of the following necessary conditions were met: 
(1) A positive match was made with the first, middle, and last name. If, for 
example, the scientist did not have a middle name listed on either the NCI award database 
or the patent database, but did have a positive first and last name, this first condition was 
considered to be fulfilled. 
(2) The second criterion involved matching the relevant time periods between the 
two databases. Observations from both databases were matched over the time period 1998-
2004, which corresponds to the initial year in which observations were available from the 
NCI database (1998-2002) and the final year in which patents were recorded in the patent 
database (1975-2004). Because applications of patents may take anywhere from three 
months to two years to be issued, the 2003 and 2004 USPTO patent records were included 
in our query. Issued patents from 1998 to 2004 by NCI scientists fulfilled the second 
criterion. 
(3) The third criterion was based on location. If the patentee resided within an 
approximate radius of 60 miles from the geographic location of the university, the third 
condition was fulfilled. 
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 (4) The fourth criterion was based on USPTO patent classification. Using the 
USPTO patent classification code, all patents were separated into respective coding 
groups. Patents which did not fall under the traditional categories of biotechnology were 
identified. All non biotech patents were evaluated and patents such as “Bread Alfalfa 
Enhancer” were rejected as an NCI scientist patent (see Appendix A for a distribution of 
patent categories).  Based on these four match criteria, a subset of 398 distinctly issued 
patentees were identified between 1998 and 2004 with a total of 1,204 patents. 
Since the focus of this chapter is to link the propensity of scientists to become 
entrepreneurs to the type of knowledge involved in their patented inventions, patent data 
for each scientist was obtained from the United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO). 
The patent records span 1975 to 2004. The inventor patent data included identification of 
the patent number of the invention, the name and address of the inventor, and the 
inventor sequence number. 
However, the USPTO records do not identify whether the scientist holding the 
patent has become an entrepreneur in the form of founding a new business. To identify 
whether the scientist had become an entrepreneur, a series of interviews with each 
scientist were undertaken, where the scientists was asked whether she had founded a 
company between 1998 and 2004. The dependent variable in the estimated probit 
regressions takes on the value of one if the scientist also started a new firm or zero 
otherwise. 
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4.4.1 Measuring Generality and Originality 
We follow Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson (1997) to measure the extent to 
which a patent reflects novelty and the extent to which it reflects generality. This second 
concept, generality, refers to the extent to which the forward patents citations are spread 
across different technological fields, rather than being concentrated in just a few 
technological fields. We compute a measure of generality of technology on the basis of a 
herfindahl index of concentration, where the number of citations in each 3 digit patent 
classification plays the same role as the sales of each firm in the traditional industrial 
organization measure.  
Two measures reflecting, “Generality” and “Originality,” as suggested by 
Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson (1997) were created, where nii j ij Generality 1 s2 
,where sij denotes the percentage of citations received by patent i that belong to 
patentclass j, out of ni patent classes (note that the sum is the Herfindahl concentration 
index). Thus as written in Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson: 
“if a patent is cited by subsequent patents that belong to a wide range of fields the 
measure will be high, whereas if most citations are concentrated in a few fields it will 
below (close to zero). Thinking of forward citations as indicative of the impact of a 
patent, a high generality score suggests that the patent presumably had a widespread 
impact, in that it influenced subsequent innovations in a variety of fields (hence the 
“generality” label). “Originality” is defined the same way, except that it refers to the 
backward citations issued. Thus, if a patent cites previous patents that belong to a narrow 
set of technologies the originality score will be low, whereas citing patents in a wide 
range of fields would render a high score. Note that these measures depend of course 
upon the patent classification system: a finer classification system would render higher 
measures, and conversely for a coarser system.” P.2 (2001) 
Several other variables were included in estimating the probit model to control for 
influences on the propensity for a scientist to become an entrepreneur already identified 
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in the literature. These measures include the age of the scientist, gender, number of co-
authored publications with a scientist employed by industry, the mean number of citation 
between 1998 and 2004, the total amount of funding received by the scientist, a dummy 
variable taking on the value of one if the scientist had a history of being awarded a patent 
prior to 1998,  a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the scientist was employed 
at a university with a comprehensive center for cancer research, a dummy variable taking 
on the value of one if the university has ivy league status, the age of the technology 
transfer office (TTO),  and the size of the TTO, measured in terms of number of full-time 
employees. The variable definitions are provided in Table One. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Description of Variables 
 
Variables 
 
Description 
 
Startup Binary variable, where if the scientist responsed to “did you found a company” =1 
Originality The number of times a patenting scientist shared a patent with another NCI scientist 
Generality The number of publications an NCI scientist shared with a private industry scientist 
Scientist Age Count variable where scientists age is recorded 
Gender Binary variable, where a male=1 
Industry Copublications Count of copublications a scientists had with industry from 1998 – 2004 
Citations per publication The average citations per publication with 1998 – 2004 
NCI Grant Total amount of funding received by a scientist from 1998 to 2004 
Prior Patentee Binary variable, where if a scientist had an issued patent prior to 1998 =1 
NCI Center Binary variable, for a scientist whose institution is recognized by NCI as a comprehensive center for cancer research, NCI Center=1 
Ivy League Binary variable, for a scientist whose institution is an Ivy League university, Ivy League=1 
Public Institution Binary variable, where a university is a publicly funded university =1 
TTO Age Year when University Technology Transfer Office was founded 
TTO Employees The mean annual number of Technology Transfer Office employees dedicated to licensing and patenting 
Patent Classification Using the USPTO patent classification system, patents were controlled for the type of Intellectual Property they belonged to. Patents were controlled for 
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their 3 and 6 digit controls system used by the USPTO. See Apendix A for 
breakdown of classification. 
  
 
The means and standard deviations of each variable are provided in Table two. It 
should be emphasized that, as the table shows, the correlation between the measures 
reflecting patent novelty and generality are quite low, suggesting that these measures 
reflect very different aspects of knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Means and Deviations of Variables 
      
      
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Startup 360 .2444444 .4303555 0 1 
Originality 297 .3189348 .276184 0 .826087 
Generality 220 .2196009 .2567887 0 .8526077 
Scientist Age 337 57.69139 1.148.756 41 95 
Gender 360 2.172.222 1.030.771 0 102 
      
Industry 
Copublications  360 3.408.333 4.509.654 0 34 
Citations per 
publication 360 2.584.525 2.076.277 0 1.303.651 
NCI Grant 360 3125040 2626173 0 1.37e+07 
Prior Patentee 360 .7972222 .5438878 0 4 
Public 
Institution 360 .4666667 .499582 0 1 
      
Ivy League 360 .1194444 .3247621 0 1 
NCI 
Compcenter 354 .5084746 .5006358 0 1 
TTO 
Employees 359 9.438.062 1.245.584 0 4.235.714 
TTO Age 359 1982.17 9.135.026 1940 2004 
cat11 360 .1916667 .39416 0 1 
      
cat12 360 .0527778 .2239007 0 1 
cat14 360 .0388889 .1935992 0 1 
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cat21 359 .0557103 .2296815 0 1 
cat22 359 .0724234 .2595494 0 1 
cat25 359 .2785515 .4489119 0 1 
      
cat26 359 .0362117 .1870773 0 1 
cat27 359 .4011142 .4908081 0 1 
 
The correlation coefficient for each variable pair is shown in Table three. 
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Table 4.3: Correlation Table of Variables 
 
 
1 startup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
2 Originality 0.1746 10.000          
3 Generality 0.1209 0.1810 10.000         
4 Scientist Age 0.1063 0.0575 0.0498 10.000        
5 Gender 0.0420 0.0032 -0.0595 0.0101 10.000       
6 
Industry 
Copublications 0.0136 -0.0433 -0.0618 -0.0148 -0.0080 10.000      
7 
Citations per 
Publication -0.1621 -0.2771 0.0258 -0.1637 0.1159 0.2129 10.000     
8 NCI Grant -0.1876 -0.1041 -0.0061 0.0093 -0.0426 -0.1011 0.3558 10.000    
9 Prior Patentee -0.1484 0.0679 0.0256 0.1794 -0.0733 0.0848 0.0587 0.0968 10.000   
10 
Public 
Institution -0.1863 0.0251 0.0994 0.0419 0.1262 -0.0649 -0.0094 0.2602 -0.1540 10.000  
11 Ivy League 0.0714 0.0344 0.1588 -0.1242 -0.1830 0.0529 0.1401 0.2126 0.0807 -0.3258 10.000 
12 NCI Center -0.0543 -0.0239 -0.0222 -0.0801 -0.0035 0.1621 0.2711 0.1169 0.0861 -0.0501 0.0988 
13 
TTO 
Employees -0.1845 0.0075 -0.0752 0.0187 0.0231 0.1858 0.3170 0.4247 0.1369 0.3521 -0.1247 
14 TTO Age -0.1895 0.0212 0.1805 0.1801 -0.0337 -0.0411 -0.2284 -0.1277 0.0573 0.1924 -0.0472 
15 Patent cat11 -0.0620 0.1090 0.0058 -0.0176 -0.0275 0.0107 -0.0210 -0.0400 0.0302 0.0638 0.0195 
16 Patent cat12 -0.1533 0.1353 -0.0802 0.2021 0.1088 0.0235 -0.1857 -0.1580 0.1077 -0.2160 -0.1121 
17 Patent cat14 0.1031 0.1784 0.2985 -0.1338 0.0112 -0.0688 -0.0587 -0.0466 0.0096 0.1384 0.0600 
18 Patent cat21 0.0693 0.0778 0.1100 -0.0200 0.0700 -0.0146 0.0498 -0.1312 -0.0461 -0.0728 0.1155 
19 Patent cat22 -0.0557 0.0574 -0.1394 -0.1714 -0.0664 0.1658 0.1832 -0.0244 -0.0500 -0.0041 0.1358 
20 Patent cat25 0.2020 -0.0537 -0.1959 0.2331 -0.0898 -0.1028 -0.2181 -0.2159 -0.0904 -0.0973 -0.1314 
21 Patent cat26 -0.1086 -0.0255 0.0176 -0.1311 0.0888 -0.0688 -0.0987 0.0103 -0.0500 0.0434 -0.0158 
22 Patent cat27 0.0083 -0.1811 -0.0106 -0.0836 0.0211 0.1124 0.2678 0.3281 0.0762 0.0627 0.0473 
23 Patent cat29 0.0237 0.0903 0.0775 -0.1061 -0.1423 0.0139 -0.1150 0.0538 0.0142 -0.0491 0.1355 
24 Patent cat210 -0.0617 0.1169 0.1098 0.0067 0.0700 -0.0608 -0.1674 -0.1392 0.1016 0.0449 -0.0721 
             
             
12 NCI Center 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
13 
TTO 
Employees 0.4182 10.000          
14 TTO Age -0.0487 -0.2418 10.000         
15 cat11 0.1165 -0.0249 -0.0004 10.000        
16 cat12 -0.2826 -0.0992 0.1331 -0.1281 10.000       
17 cat14 0.1035 0.1203 0.0450 -0.1046 -0.0832 10.000      
18 cat21 0.0547 -0.0877 -0.0174 0.0025 -0.0656 -0.0535 10.000     
19 cat22 0.0080 -0.0377 -0.1730 0.2381 -0.0832 -0.0679 -0.0535 10.000    
20 cat25 -0.0693 -0.1861 0.0357 0.0556 -0.1950 -0.1591 -0.1254 -0.1591 10.000   
21 cat26 -0.0397 -0.1354 0.1932 -0.1046 -0.0014 0.0292 -0.0535 -0.0679 -0.1591 10.000  
22 cat27 0.1950 0.2925 -0.2885 -0.0491 -0.2122 -0.1732 -0.1365 -0.1732 -0.4059 -0.1732 10.000 
23 cat29 0.0232 0.0280 0.0101 -0.0761 0.0485 0.2095 -0.0389 -0.0494 -0.1158 -0.0494 -0.1260 
24 cat210 -0.0044 -0.0728 0.1384 0.0873 0.0357 0.3072 -0.0422 -0.0535 -0.1254 -0.0535 -0.1365 
             
25 cat29    1 26          
26 cat210 -0.0389 10.000          
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4.6 Empirical Results 
 
 
To test the hypothesis that the propensity for a scientist to become an entrepreneur 
is influenced by the extent to which her intellectual property can be characterized as 
being novel and by being general, a probit model was estimated where the dependent 
variable takes on the value of one if the scientist started a new firm and zero if she did not 
(table three) and a marginal affects table is provided (table four). 
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Table 4.4: Clustered Probit Estimate of Scientist Entrepreneurship 
 
 
v1 v2 v2 v2 v2 
COEFFICIENT short full no tto no ncicomp 
     
Originality 1.099e+00*** 1.168e+00** 1.242e+00*** 1.145e+00** 
 [4.150e-01] [4.637e-01] [4.667e-01] [4.583e-01] 
Generality 9.294e-01* 1.278e+00** 1.105e+00** 1.329e+00** 
 [4.832e-01] [5.273e-01] [4.914e-01] [5.451e-01] 
Scientist Age 1.141e-02 3.271e-02* 3.135e-02 3.042e-02 
 [1.934e-02] [1.978e-02] [2.058e-02] [1.938e-02] 
Gender 5.168e-01 7.004e-01 8.004e-01 6.875e-01 
 [5.894e-01] [5.497e-01] [5.811e-01] [5.667e-01] 
Industry Copublications  5.187e-02* 3.884e-02 5.184e-02* 
  [2.832e-02] [2.893e-02] [2.770e-02] 
Citations per Publication  -2.335e-02* -1.656e-02 -2.402e-02* 
  [1.358e-02] [1.329e-02] [1.293e-02] 
NCI Grant  -1.074e-07 -9.719e-08 -9.615e-08 
  [1.082e-07] [1.052e-07] [1.011e-07] 
Prior Patentee -6.870e-01* -8.057e-01** -6.584e-01 
  [4.125e-01] [4.003e-01] [4.088e-01] 
Public Institutions -6.296e-01 -8.719e-01* -5.816e-01 
  [4.843e-01] [4.549e-01] [4.760e-01] 
Ivy League  2.732e-01 2.079e-01 2.050e-01 
  [5.988e-01] [6.011e-01] [5.745e-01] 
NCI Center -2.228e-01 -4.095e-01 - 
  [4.921e-01] [4.537e-01]  
TTO Employees  -2.476e-02 -1.182e-02 -2.930e-02 
  [2.320e-02] [2.038e-02] [2.181e-02] 
TTO Age -4.084e-02* - -4.367e-02* 
  [2.391e-02]  [2.280e-02] 
cat11 -5.268e-01 -4.661e-01 -4.361e-01 -5.042e-01 
 [3.647e-01] [3.848e-01] [3.567e-01] [3.896e-01] 
cat12 -3.111e-01 -1.175e+00 -1.131e+00 -1.089e+00 
 [8.398e-01] [9.252e-01] [1.017e+00] [8.829e-01] 
cat14 1.070e+00** 1.370e+00** 1.554e+00*** 1.296e+00** 
 [4.769e-01] [5.548e-01] [5.457e-01] [5.595e-01] 
cat21 1.129e+00* 3.182e-01 6.138e-01 2.850e-01 
 [6.587e-01] [7.471e-01] [7.235e-01] [7.502e-01] 
cat22 1.091e+00 4.880e-01 9.632e-01 4.921e-01 
 [6.956e-01] [7.136e-01] [7.668e-01] [7.023e-01] 
cat25 1.587e+00*** 9.161e-01* 1.131e+00* 8.989e-01* 
 [5.563e-01] [5.325e-01] [5.813e-01] [5.324e-01] 
cat26 -2.738e-01 -9.249e-01* -9.272e-01** -9.296e-01* 
 [4.221e-01] [5.245e-01] [4.387e-01] [5.599e-01] 
cat27 1.123e+00** 7.880e-01 1.155e+00** 7.352e-01 
 [4.930e-01] [5.448e-01] [5.368e-01] [5.440e-01] 
cat29 7.424e-01 2.968e-01 3.363e-01 2.384e-01 
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 [5.996e-01] [5.951e-01] [5.657e-01] [5.647e-01] 
cat210 -5.384e-01 
-
1.070e+00** -1.014e+00** -1.065e+00** 
 [5.006e-01] [4.666e-01] [4.755e-01] [4.526e-01] 
Constant -3.355e+00** 7.821e+01* -2.895e+00** 8.388e+01* 
 [1.339e+00] [4.733e+01] [1.449e+00] [4.512e+01] 
Observations 174 173 173 173 
R-squared . . . . 
LR chi2 43.68 92.79 74.03 90.72 
R-squared adjusted 0.175 0.346 0.319 0.343 
Observations 174 173 173 173 
r2_p 0.175 0.346 0.319 0.343 
chi2 43.68 92.79 74.03 90.72 
df_m 14 23 22 22 
Ll -84.54 -66.82 -69.61 -67.08 
ll_0 -102.5 -102.2 -102.2 -102.2 
N_clust 75 74 74 74 
Robust standard errors in 
brackets      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 
 
 
As the positive as statistically significant coefficient of originality indicates, a 
scientist is more likely to become an entrepreneur if the patent reflects original 
knowledge rather than incremental knowledge. Similarly, as the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of generality suggests, a scientist has a higher propensity to start a 
new firm is her knowledge is more general than specific. These results are found to hold 
across four different specifications of the probit model, based on the inclusion of different 
control variables. 
The control variables are generally not statistically significant. Scientist age is 
statistically significant in only one of the four specifications, and gender is never 
statistically significant. Neither, human capital, as measured by citations, nor social 
capital, as measured by co-authored publications with an industry scientist, is statistically 
significant.  The characteristics of the technology transfer office (TTO), also do not have 
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any statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a scientist becoming an 
entrepreneur. 
Table 4.5: Marginal Affects Table of Scientist  
 
 Coefficients 
Dependent Variable 
Scientist 
Startups 
  
Originality 1.168e+00** 
 [4.637e-01] 
Generality 1.278e+00** 
 [5.273e-01] 
Scientist Age 3.271e-02* 
 [1.978e-02] 
Gender 7.004e-01 
 [5.497e-01] 
Industry Copublications 5.187e-02* 
 [2.832e-02] 
Citations per Publication -2.335e-02* 
 [1.358e-02] 
NCI Grant -1.074e-07 
 [1.082e-07] 
Prior Patentee -6.870e-01* 
 [4.125e-01] 
Public Institutions -6.296e-01 
 [4.843e-01] 
Ivy League 2.732e-01 
 [5.988e-01] 
Nci Center -2.228e-01 
 [4.921e-01] 
TTO Employees -2.476e-02 
 [2.320e-02] 
TTO Age -4.084e-02* 
 [2.391e-02] 
cat11 -4.661e-01 
 [3.848e-01] 
cat12 -1.175e+00 
 [9.252e-01] 
cat14 1.370e+00** 
 [5.548e-01] 
cat21 3.182e-01 
 [7.471e-01] 
cat22 4.880e-01 
 [7.136e-01] 
cat25 9.161e-01* 
 [5.325e-01] 
cat26 -9.249e-01* 
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 [5.245e-01] 
cat27 7.880e-01 
 [5.448e-01] 
cat29 2.968e-01 
 [5.951e-01] 
cat210 -1.070e+00** 
 [4.666e-01] 
Constant 7.821e+01* 
 [4.733e+01] 
Observations 173 
R-squared . 
LR chi2 92.79 
R-squared adjusted 0.346 
Observations 173 
Xmfx_y 0.167 
N_clust 74 
ll_0 -102.2 
Ll -66.82 
df_m 23 
chi2 92.79 
r2_p 0.346 
Robust standard errors in 
brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
As shown in Table four, the marginal affects are only significant for originality 
and generality. Indicating that with one lest patent citation for originality, there is a 116% 
change of a scientist starting a company while with one more forward patent citation in 
generality equaling a 127% likelihood of a scientist starting a firm. 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The empirical results provide a striking contrast to previous studies. Rather than 
pointing to characteristics specific to the scientist, such as age and gender, or 
characteristics specific to her human capital and social capital, such as citations and co-
publications with industry scientists, or even characteristics specific to the TTO, this 
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chapter has found that it is the nature of the knowledge and technology inherent in the 
patent that influences whether or not a scientist becomes an entrepreneur.  
In particular, this chapter has found two characteristics reflecting the knowledge 
underlying a patented invention influence scientist entrepreneurship. The first is the 
degree of originality or novelty of the patent. The empirical results of this chapter suggest 
that the more original or novel the patent, the more likely a scientist is to become an 
entrepreneur. This empirical finding is consistent with the view that knowledge which is 
highly novel or original is characterized by a greater extent of uncertainty, making it 
more difficult for the holder of that knowledge, i.e. the scientist, to appropriate the value 
of her ideas using some alternative mode of commercialization.  Similarly, the degree of 
generality also increases the likelihood of a scientist becoming an entrepreneur. Again, 
more general knowledge is associated with a greater degree of uncertainty, making it 
more difficult for the holder of that knowledge to appropriate its value through traditional 
modes of technology transfer. 
Thus, the results of this chapter suggest that while the amount of human capital 
and social capital may be important in generating entrepreneurship from universities, it is 
the type of knowledge underling inventive activity that may also be important in 
understanding why some scientists choose to become entrepreneurs while others do not. 
Knowledge that is highly uncertain, in that it reflects originality and generality, increases 
the likelihood of a scientist becoming an entrepreneur. There may, in fact, be other 
characteristics of knowledge that do not have a neutural effect on scientist 
entrepreneurship. Subsequent research might prove fruitful in considering not just the 
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amount of knowledge generated by scientific work, but also other dimensions shaping the 
type of knowledge generated, and how it is linked to scientist entrepreneurship. 
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Chapter 5: Scientist Commercialization as a Conduit of Knowledge Spillovers 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Why and how will scientists decide to combine to commercialize their academic 
research? The answers to this question are not only important to institutions and scientists 
engaged in research. The New Endogenous Growth models and theories highlight the 
central role that investments in science and research play in generating economic growth 
(Romer, 1985; and Lucas, 1993). But more recently, public policy makers, ranging from 
local communities, to states and even entire countries have pointed out that such 
investments in knowledge and research do not automatically spill over into 
commercialized new products and innovations. Rather, what  Acs et al. (2004) and 
Audretsch et al. (2005) term as the knowledge filter effectively impedes the spillover and 
commercialization of investments in knowledge, thereby limiting the rate of return in 
terms of employment creation and economic growth accruing from public and private 
investments in science and research. In the presence of a high knowledge filter, 
investments in science and research do not automatically spill over and become 
commercialized, resulting in vigorous rates of economic growth and employment 
generation, as assumed in models of endogenous growth. The combination of high 
investments in science and research but low rates of economic growth and employment 
generation led first to what was termed as the Swedish Paradox and somewhat later 
adapted by European Commission as The European Paradox. Audretsch et al. (2005) and 
Acs et. al (2004) identify activities that involve the commercialization of science and 
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research as the Missing Link in the process of economic growth. In the absence of 
scientist commercialization of research, investments in science and research will not 
generate an adequate rate of return, in terms of economic growth and job creation.  
5.2 How and Where are Scientists Creative? 
Why will a scientist choose to combine her scientific creativity with 
entrepreneurial creativity? A number of theories and hypotheses have posited why some 
scientists choose to commercialize research while others do not, and some compelling 
insights have been garnered through previous empirical studies. These include the 
scientist life-cycle, which highlights the role of reputation, the knowledge production 
function, which highlights the role of scientific human capital and resources, and the 
regional and university contexts, which highlight the role of geographically bounded 
spillovers and institutional incentives. 
A large literature has emerged focusing on what has become known as the 
appropriability problem. The underlying issue revolves around how firms which invest in 
the creation of new knowledge can best appropriate the economic returns from that 
knowledge (Arrow, 1962). Audretsch (1995) proposed shifting the unit of observation 
away from exogenously assumed firms to individuals – agents with endowments of new 
economic knowledge. When the lens is shifted away from the firm to the individual as the 
relevant unit of analysis, the appropriability issue remains, but the question becomes; 
"How can scientists with a given endowment of new knowledge best appropriate the 
returns from that knowledge?" Levin and Stephan (1991) suggest that the answer is, It 
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depends – it depends on both the career trajectory as well as the stage of the life-cycle of 
the scientist. 
The university or academic career trajectory encourages and rewards the 
production of new scientific knowledge. Thus, the goal of the scientist in the university 
context is to establish priority. This is done most efficiently through publication in 
scientific journals (Audretsch and Stephan, 2000). By contrast, with a career trajectory in 
the private sector, scientists are rewarded for the production of new economic knowledge, 
or knowledge which has been commercialized in the market, but not necessarily new 
scientific knowledge per se. In fact, scientists working in industry are often discouraged 
from sharing knowledge externally with the scientific community through publication. As 
a result of these differential incentive structures, industrial and academic scientists 
develop distinct career trajectories. 
The appropriability question confronting academic scientists can be considered in 
the context of the model of scientist human capital over the life-cycle. Scientist life-cycle 
models suggest that early in their careers scientists invest heavily in human capital in 
order to build a scientific reputation (Levin and Stephan, 1991). In the later stages of their 
career, the scientist trades or cashes in this reputation for economic return. Thus, early in 
her career, the scientist invests in the creation of scientific knowledge in order to 
establish a reputation that signals the value of that knowledge to the scientific 
community.  
With maturity, scientists seek ways to appropriate the economic value of the new 
knowledge. Thus, academic scientists may seek to commercialize their scientific research 
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within a life-cycle context. The life-cycle model of the scientist implies that, ceteris 
paribus, scientist reputation should play a role in the decision to commercialize 
An implication of the knowledge production function formalized by Zvi Griliches 
(1978) is that those scientists with a greater research and scientific prowess have the 
capacity for generating a greater scientific output. But how does scientific capability 
translate into observable characteristics that can promote or impede commercialization 
efforts? Because the commercialization of scientific research is particularly risky and 
uncertain (Audretsch and Stephan, 2000), a strong scientific reputation, as evidenced 
through vigorous publication and formidable citations, provides a greatly valued signal of 
scientific credibility and capability to any anticipated commercialized venture or project. 
This suggests a hypothesis linking measures of the quality of the scientist, or her 
scientific reputation as measured by citations and publications, to commercialization. 
Scientist location can influence the decision to commercialize for two reasons. 
First, as Jaffe (1989), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 
(1993), and Glaeser, Kallal, Sheinkman and Shleifer (2002) show, knowledge tends to 
spill over within geographically bounded regions. This implies that scientists working in 
regions with a high level of investments in new knowledge can more easily access and 
generate new scientific ideas. This suggests that scientists working in knowledge clusters 
should tend to be more productive than their counterparts who are geographically 
isolated. As Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992, p. 1126) have observed, 
“Intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and 
continents.” 
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A second component of externalities involves not the technological knowledge, 
but rather behavioural knowledge. As Bercoviz and Feldman (2004) show for a study 
based on the commercialization activities of scientists at Johns Hopkins and Duke 
University, the likelihood of a scientist engaging in commercialization activity, which is 
measured as disclosing an invention, is shaped based on the commercialization behaviour 
of the doctoral supervisor in the institution where the scientist was trained, as well as the 
commercialization behaviour and attitudes exhibited by the chair and peers at the relevant 
department.  
Thus, the locational and institutional contexts can influence the propensity for 
scientists to engage in commercialization activities by providing access to spatially 
bounded knowledge spillovers and by shaping the institutional setting and behavioural 
norms and attitudes towards commercialization. 
5.3 Measurement Issues  
The commercialization activity of university scientists was measured by starting 
with those scientists awarded a research grant by the National Cancer Institute between 
1998 and 2002. Of those research grant awards, the largest twenty percent, which 
included 1,693 scientist awardees, were taken to form the database used in this chapter. 
The National Cancer Institute (NCI) awarded a total of $5,350,977,742 to the top 1,693 
scientists in the United States from 1998 to 2002.  
Since the focus of this chapter is on the propensity for scientists to commercialize 
their research, commercialization must be operationalized and measured. The most 
common measure of commercialization of research is patents. Thus, the propensity for 
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NCI recipient scientists to patent was analyzed by obtaining patent data from the United 
States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO). The patent database spans 1975 to 2004. The 
inventor patent data included identification of the patent number of the invention, the 
name and address of the inventor, and the inventor sequence number. 
Figure 1 shows that the geographic distribution of patentees varied both across 
regions as well as by gender. In some regions, such as New York, Mid-Atlantic, the 
North West and Texas, the propensity for females to patent exceeded that of their male 
colleagues. By contrast, in other regions, such as California, New England and the Great 
Lakes, male scientists exceeded a greater propensity to patent.  
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Figure 1: Patents by Region and Gender 
Figure 1: Patents by Region and Gender
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Gender also clearly played a role in a number of other dimensions. For example, 
Figure 2 shows that the mean amount of the NCI grant was considerably greater for male 
scientists who patented than for their female counterparts. 
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Figure 2: NCI Grant Award by Gender for Patenting Scientists 
Figure 2: NCI Grant Award by Gender for Patenting Scientists
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To shed light on the question; “Why do some scientists patent their scientific 
research while others do not?” a logit model was estimated for the unit of observation of 
the scientist identified in the NCI database where the dependent variable takes on the 
value of one if she has patented over the time period 1998-2004 and zero if she did not. 
The previous section suggests five different types of factors shaping the decision 
by a scientist to commercialize her research – resources, personal characteristics, 
scientific human capital, nature of the university, and location. These factors are 
empirically operationalized through the following measures: 
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Award Amount – This variable is the mean total NCI awarded to the scientist between 
1998 and 2002. The award amount was obtained from the original NCI award excel 
sheet. If external funding of scientific research is conducive to commercialization, a 
positive coefficient of the Award Amount would be expected. 
Male –This is a dummy variable assigned the value of one for males (1,310) of the 
overall 1,693 included in the NCI database. The gender of each scientist was obtained by 
“Googling” their names. The estimated coefficient will reflect whether the gender of the 
scientist influences the propensity to commercialize research. 
Location --Ten different locational dummy variables were created taking on the value of 
one for Texas, California, New York, Minnesota, Great Lakes (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan and Wisconsin), North West (Oregon and Washington), New England (Maine, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts), South Atlantic 
(Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida), Mid Atlantic 
(Washington DC, Maryland, Pennsylvania), and Other (Arizona, Alabama, New Mexico, 
Colorado, Nebraska, Hawaii and Iowa.) Those regions which tend to have greater 
investments in research and science, and also have developed a culture more encouraging 
university and scientist commercialization, such as California and New England, might 
be expected to have a positive coefficient. 
University Type 
Ivy League – A dummy  variable was created taking on the value of one for all scientists 
employed at Brown University, Cornell University, Columbia University, Dartmouth 
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College, Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of Pennsylvania and 
Yale University.  
Public Universities – A dummy variable was created taking on the value of one for 
scientists employed at public universities and zero otherwise. Because they are at least 
partially financed by the public, state universities tend to have a stronger mandate for 
outreach and commercialization of research. This may suggest a positive coefficient. 
Carnegie Classifications – The Carnegie Classification of Universities (2000 edition) 
provides a comprehensive study classifying universities by types of degree offered. Each 
type of institution is defined according to the types and numbers of degrees offered in 
different fields. The categories are: 
1. Special Medical Institution (graduate only that specializes in medical degrees (i.e. 
doctors and nurses) 
2. Research Intensive University (grants doctoral degrees in three fields and fewer 
than 50 annually) 
3. Research Extensive University (grants doctoral degrees in more than three fields 
and more degrees than 50 annually) 
4. Bachelors and Masters College (grants only BA/BS and masters degrees but no 
Ph.D.s) 
5. Associate’s College (two year institution) 
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Scientist Human Capital 
Citations – A specific computer program was designed to measure the citations of the 
1,693 scientists through the “Expanded Science Citation Index.” A higher number of 
citations reflex a higher level of human capital and scientific reputation (Audretsch and 
Stephan, 2000). A positive coefficient would reflect that the likelihood of 
commercialization is greater for more productive scientists. 
Publications – A specific computer program was designed to measure the publications of 
the scientist, which should also reflect the level of human capital and scientific reputation 
(Audretsch and Stephan, 2000).  
Star Scientist – A scientist is classified as being a star if she is in the top ten percent of 
publications. A dummy variable was created taking on the value of one for those 
scientists with a star classification and zero otherwise. Star scientists may be able to 
attract resources for commercialization, suggesting a positive coefficient (Audretsch and 
Stephan, 1996). 
The results from estimating the logit model using the patent measure for scientist 
commercialization are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Probit Estimation of Scientist Knowledge Diffusion - Patents  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male .884 
(6.33)** 
.896 
(6.43)** 
.878 
(6.27)** 
.878 
(6.29)** 
Medical University .248 
(1.52) 
- .228 
(1.16) 
- 
Extensive University - .020 
(0.14) 
- - 
Intensive University -.140 
(-0.63) 
- -.171 
(-0.77) 
- 
Star Scientist .298 
(1.75)* 
- - - 
Citations - - .643 
(2.97)** 
.644 
(2.96)** 
Papers Published - -.010 
(-0.05) 
- - 
NCI Total Award .992 
(0.951) 
-.342 
(-0.02) 
-.297 
(-0.18) 
-.003 
(-0.19) 
Public Institutions -.182 
(-1.44) 
-.202 
(-1.62) 
-.164 
(-1.29) 
-.209 
(-1.69)* 
Ivy League .219 
(1.13) 
.171 
(0.89) 
.227 
(1.16) 
- 
Texas - .191 
(0.438) 
-.593 
(-2.01)** 
.259 
(1.11) 
North West -.361 
(-1.29) 
-.406 
(-1.48) 
-.966 
(-3.32)** 
-.283 
(-0.97) 
California .597 
(3.00)** 
.485 
(2.80)** 
- .587 
(2.97)** 
New England .463 
(0.048)** 
.375412 
( 1.73)* 
-.153 
(-0.67) 
.526 
(2.31)** 
South .134 
(0.64) 
- .472 
(-2.21)** 
.169 
(0.78) 
Mid Atlantic .090 
(0.47) 
-.137 
(-1.57) 
-.504 
(-2.55)** 
.184 
(0.94) 
Great Lakes - - -.666 
(-3.27)** 
- 
Minnesota -.659 
(-1.79)* 
-.580 
(-1.57) 
-1.264 
(-3.23)** 
-.510 
(-1.35) 
New York -.162 
(-0.70) 
-.211 
(-0.95) 
-.741 
(-3.14)** 
-.062 
(-0.27) 
Other   -0.637 
(-3.03)** 
0.033 
(0.874) 
Intercept -1.388 
(-6.41)** 
-1.286 
(-5.44)** 
-0.828 
(-3.97)** 
-1.432 
(-6.82)** 
Psuedo R² 0.04 .037 .043 .041 
>CHI-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sample Size 1683 1683 1683 1683 
Notes:  t-statistic in brackets. 
* Statistically significant at the two-tailed test for 90 percent level of confidence 
** Statistically significant at the two-tailed test for 95 percent level of confidence 
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 The various measures of scientist human capital, or scientist quality, are highly 
correlated and therefore including them in the same estimated model may result in 
multicollinearity. Thus, the first column presents results when the measure of star 
scientist is used, while the second column includes the measure of publications, and the 
third and fourth column citations.  As the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of start scientist suggests, those scientists with a prolific publication record tend to have a 
higher propensity to commercialize research through patents. Similarly, those scientists 
with greater citations also have a greater likelihood of filing for a patent.  
There is also considerable statistical evidence suggesting that the gender of a 
scientist influences the likelihood of commercialization in the form of patents. In 
particular, being a male will elevate the propensity for a scientist to patent. The evidence 
concerning the impact on university type on the patenting activities of scientists is weaker 
and more ambiguous. There is at least some evidence suggesting that being employed in 
a public university may actually reduce the likelihood of a scientist patenting. Finally, the 
region in which the scientist is located apparently influences her propensity to patent. In 
particular, those scientists located in California and New England exhibit a greater 
likelihood of patenting, even after controlling for the other main factors, such as scientist 
quality and gender. 
5.4 Conclusions 
Globalization has triggered a shift in the comparative advantage of leading 
developed countries away from the factor of capital and towards knowledge. For the 
factor of knowledge to be effective in generating employment, economic growth 
and international competitiveness, it must spill over to become commercialized. As 
Acs et al. (2003) and Audretsch et al. (2006) emphasize, such knowledge spillovers 
are not automatic and cannot be assumed to exist. Thus, in terms of Richard 
Florida’s insights about creativity,  investments in scientific creativity need to be 
combined with commercial creativity to facilitate the spillover of such knowledge 
that can ultimately contribute to economic growth. Such scientific creativity can be 
combined with commercial creativity by scientists who choose to commercialize 
their research. 
This chapter has identified why some scientists choose to combine scientific 
and commercial creativity while others do not. In particular, the human capital and 
reputation of the scientist play an important, as does the context, in terms of 
location and particular type of institution where the scientist is employed.  The 
evidence suggests that it is those scientists with the greatest amount of knowledge 
who have a higher propensity to commercialize their research. However, such 
scientist commercialization is conditioned by both the type of university as well as 
the region  
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Chapter 6: Radical Innovation: Literature Review and Development of 
an Indicator 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the early days of Joseph Schumpeter in the 1920s, the concept of 
radical innovation in economic theory has been a driving force for economic 
growth. Yet the term offers an abundance of concepts and definitions that can be 
difficult for policy-makers and scholars hoping to identify ex ante radical 
innovations to expedite and facilitate growth. Building a universal and compelling 
concept and methodology to identify radical innovation remains elusive and 
problematic for scholars for several reasons. First, terminology of the definition has 
varied from really new to breakthrough, discontinuous, generational and, finally, 
radical innovation. The differing etymology is, in part, due to the differing fields of 
research involved in the study of radical innovation. The differing terms each carry 
the spirit of what radical innovation creates, yet they are unable to provide a 
unifying foundation for distinguishing radical innovation. 
The second problem relates to the difficulty associated with quantifying or 
recognizing what actually constitutes a radical innovation ex ante, (the famous “I 
know it when I see it issue.”) Traditionally, policy-makers and scholars have been 
unable to identify nascent radical innovations ex ante. Given the difficulty of 
identifying innovations ex ante, how can one aggregate radical innovations’ 
contribution to economic growth for a region or country? For this reason, most 
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scholars have left the definition abstract and instead have focused their research on 
the concept and the ex post impact of singular fields of radical innovative activity.  
This chapter will define innovation and provide a brief description of and 
distinction between radical innovation and incremental innovative activity. It then 
applies the Dahlin and Behrens (2005) heterogeneous classifications of radical 
innovations found in the literature. The classifications identify the different forms 
of radical innovation that are found in the literature. Finally, the chapter offers 
conclusions and suggestions to identify radical innovations ex ante in a uniform 
manner.   
 
6.2 Origins of Radical Innovation 
 
The concept of innovation, at least implicitly, dates back at least to Joseph 
Schumpeter’s seminal 1934 treatise, The Theory of Economic Development; and 
Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle. His term, the 
“process of creative destruction,” conceptually and literally began a radical 
revolution in economic theory and commercial orientation. The process, as 
Schumpeter argued, was one where large firms were destroyed by the entrepreneur 
who seizes commercial opportunities from inventors. Entrepreneurs enter the 
market with such commercial competitive advantages, due to their potential 
innovations, that they not only compete but “destroy” incumbent firms and their 
respective economies of scale due to the entrepreneur’s superior innovation. 
Schumpeter’s work on creative destruction created the foundation for innovation.  
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As McCraw (2007) points out, at the centre of Schumpeter’s intellectual 
contribution was a focus on innovation. Schumpeter, more than any of the great 
economists before him, viewed innovation as the driving force of progress and 
development. But Schumpeter also emphasized that innovation, and therefore 
economic progress, comes at a price ― creative destruction. Just as the factory 
wiped out the blacksmith shop and the car superseded the horse and buggy, 
incumbents will be displaced by innovating entrepreneurs.  As McCraw (2007, p. 6) 
concludes about Schumpeter, “He knew that creative destruction fosters economic 
growth but also that it undercuts cherished human values. He saw that poverty 
brings misery but also that prosperity cannot assure peace of mind.” 
Schumpeter did not distinguish explicitly between radical innovation and 
other types of innovative activity, however. While one may infer that Schumpeter’s 
creative destruction replaces old technologies and expands new commercial 
opportunities, the concept of radical innovation must refer to a much more specific 
type of innovation that is traditionally identified in ex post analysis.  
Along with Schumpeter, many other scholars applied ex post identification 
of radical innovations for their empirical investigation. This method, however, 
creates several problems for both scholars as well as policy-makers. As will be 
discussed below, ex post identification causes two problems. Firstly, in a practical 
sense, one would ideally wish to identify an emerging radical innovation at an early 
stage in order to expedite commercial entry into the market. Secondly, and more 
importantly, studies based on ex post analysis have inherent methodological 
problems. According to Dahlin and Behrens (2005, p. 718), “basing identification 
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of radical inventions on market success by only including innovations in a study, 
for instance, ignoring inventions that never reach the market, creates a selection 
bias; indeed, technologies might be radical in a technological sense without having 
significant market impact, since the market impact of a technology is affected by 
many non-technological conditions.” 
6.2.1 Firm Size and Radical Innovations  
 
In order to understand where radical innovations originate, we will first 
offer a brief summary of radical innovations to better understand how 
heterogeneous the sources of radical innovations are.  
Small Firm Entrepreneurship 
As illustrated in Table 1, radical innovations delivered by small firm 
entrepreneurs up until 1995 are substantial. Since 1995, many new drivers of 
economic growth have emerged; for example, information technology (e.g. 
Microsoft, Dell, Skype and eBay) and renewable resource technology (hybrid 
motor, wind technology) have been placed on the impressive list. While there is no 
empirical investigation of how the radical technologies were developed, one can ex 
post immediately appreciate their value-added to economies. 
Table 1: Radical Innovations from Small Firm Entrepreneurs 
 
Air conditioning Heart valve Pre-stressed concrete 
Air passenger service Heat sensor Prefabricated housing 
Airplane Helicopter Pressure-sensitive tape 
Articulated tractor chassis High-resolution CAT scanner Programmable computer 
Cellophane artificial skin High-resolution digital X-ray Quick-frozen food 
Assembly line High-resolution X-ray 
microscope 
Reading machine 
Audio tape recorder Human growth hormone Rotary oil drilling bit 
Bakelite Hydraulic brake Safety razor 
Biomagnetic imaging Integrated circuit Six-axis robot arm 
Biosynthetic insulin Kidney stone laser Soft contact lens 
Catalytic petroleum cracking Large computer Solid fuel rocket engine 
Computerized blood pressure 
controller 
Link trainer Stereoscopic map scanner 
Continuous casting  Microprocessor Strain gauge 
Cotton picker Nuclear magnetic resonance 
scanner 
Strobe lights 
Defibrillator Optical scanner Supercomputer 
DNA fingerprinting Oral contraceptives Two-armed mobile robot 
Double-knit fabric Outboard engine Vacuum tube 
Electronic spreadsheet Overnight national delivery Variable output transformer 
Freewing aircraft Pacemaker Vascular lesion laser 
FM radio Personal computer Xerography 
Front-end loader Phototypesetting X-ray telescope 
Geodesic dome Polaroid camera Zipper 
Gyrocompass Portable computer Blackberry 
Source: Baumol (2004) 
 
6.2.2 Large Firm Innovation 
The origins of radical innovations are more complex than the traditional 
belief of inventors in a garage coming up with a new idea. There are many cases 
where large and successful corporations have developed, implemented and profited 
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from in-house radical innovations (e.g. Nokia and the cellphone; Kodak and the 
digital camera; Apple Computers and the iPhone). As illustrated in Table 2, there is 
a large field of radical innovation where large firms have invented and delivered 
products to the market. 
Table 2 Radical Innovations from Large Firms 
AM radio Wireless Telegraph and Signal Co. 
Analogue answering machine American Telegraphone Co. 
Analogue quartz watch Seiko 
Black-and-white celluloid roll camera Eastman Dry Plate & Film Co. 
Camcorder Sony 
Cassette tape player  Phillips 
Compact disc player Phillips and Sony 
Cellular telephone Motorola 
Digital answering machine  Sharp 
Digital camera Sony 
Digital high-definition television Panasonic 
Digital video disc (DVD) player Toshiba 
Disposable shaver Bic Corp. 
Electric blanket  General Electric 
Electronic colour television RCA 
Electronic desktop calculator Sharp 
Laptop computer Tandy Corp. (Radioshack) 
Laser disc player Phillips 
Laser printer IBM 
Microwave Raytheon 
Mini-disc player Sony 
Palm computer Amstrad 
Source: Chandy and Tellis (2000) 
6.3 Characteristics of Radical Innovation vis-à-vis Incremental Innovation 
Dahlin and Behrens (2005) explicitly link the extent to which an invention is 
radical to the nature of the ideas upon which the innovative activity is based, and 
the extent to which the innovative activity involves information that is codified or 
knowledge that is inherently tacit in nature. Information refers to facts that can be 
codified and where the valuation across different agents, or employees, and layers 
of decision-making bureaucracy within the organization is relatively constant. 
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Innovative activity based on economic information tends to be incremental in nature 
in that it generally involves an organizational consensus about the potential value 
and impact of the innovation. Thus, incremental innovation tends to support and 
enhance the status quo organization. 
By contrast, radical innovation is based on knowledge involving tacit ideas 
that not only defy codification, but also whose economic value remains highly 
uncertain and asymmetric and tends to generate radical innovations. The expected 
value of any new idea is highly uncertain, and has a much greater variance than 
would be associated with innovative activity based on information. When it comes 
to radical innovation, there is uncertainty about whether the new producer service 
can be produced, how it can be produced, and whether sufficient demand for that 
visualized new product or service might actually materialize (Arrow, 1962).  
In addition, new ideas constituting tacit knowledge are typically associated 
with considerable asymmetries. For example, in order to evaluate a proposed new 
idea concerning a new biotechnology product, the decision maker might not only 
need to have a PhD in biotechnology, but also a specialization in the exact scientific 
area. Differences in education, background and experience can result in divergence 
in the expected value of a new project or variance in the outcomes anticipated from 
pursuing that new idea, both of which can lead to divergence in recognition and 
evaluation of opportunities between economic agents and decision-making 
hierarchies. Such divergence in the valuation of new ideas will become even greater 
if the new idea is not consistent with the core competence and technological 
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direction of the incumbent firm. Thus, radical innovation tends to be disruptive to 
the status quo organization and strategy of the firm. 
In fact, what actually constitutes a radical innovation and distinguishes it 
from an incremental innovation may depend upon the question being asked and the 
perspective in which innovative activity is being considered. Table 3 presents a 
broad spectrum of perspectives on what distinguishes a radical innovation from an 
incremental innovation. For example, in terms of the time frame, the impacts of 
incremental innovations tend to be realized over a shorter time period than those of 
radical innovations. Similarly, the source and process of idea generation and 
opportunity recognition varies between incremental and radical innovations. 
Table 3 Distinguishing between Incremental and Radical Innovations 
 
Focus Incremental Innovation Radical Innovation 
Time frame Short term ― 6 to 24 
months 
Long term ― usually 10 
years or more 
Development strategy Step by step from 
conception to 
commercialization, high 
levels of certainty 
Discontinuous, iterative, 
setbacks, high levels of 
uncertainty 
Idea generation and 
opportunity recognition 
Continuous stream of 
incremental improvement; 
critical events largely 
anticipated 
Ideas often pop up 
unexpectedly and from 
unexpected sources, slack 
tends to be required; focus 
and purpose might change 
over the course of 
development 
Process Formal, established, 
generally with stages and 
gates 
A formal, structured 
process might hinder 
Business case A complete business case 
can be produced at the 
outset, customer reaction 
can be anticipated 
The business case evolves 
throughout development 
and might change; 
predicting customer 
reaction is difficult 
Players Can be assigned to a cross-
functional team with clearly 
assigned and understood 
roles; skill emphasis is on 
making things happen 
Skill areas required; key 
players may come and go; 
finding the right skills often 
relies on informal 
networks; flexibility, 
persistence and willingness 
to experiment are required 
Development structure Typically, a cross-functional 
team operates within an 
existing business unit 
Tends to originate in 
research and development 
(R&D); tends to be driven 
by the determination of one 
individual who pursues it 
wherever he or she is 
Resources and skill 
requirements 
All skills and competences 
necessary tend to be within 
the project team; resource 
allocation follows a 
standardized process 
It is difficult to predict skill 
and competence 
requirements; additional 
expertise from outside 
might be required; informal 
networks; flexibility is 
required 
Operating unit involvement Operating units are involved 
from the beginning 
Involving operating units 
too early can again lead to 
great ideas becoming small 
Source: Stamm (2003) 
 120
 
6.4 Entrepreneurship, Radical Innovation and the Knowledge Filter 
An important and broadly accepted strand of literature suggests that small 
and new firms will be at a competitive disadvantage with respect to generating 
innovative activity in general and radical innovations in particular. According to 
Griliches’ (1979) model of the knowledge production function, innovative activity 
is the direct result of investments made by a firm in knowledge inputs, such as 
R&D and human capital. Since larger firms generally invest significantly more in 
R&D than small and new firms, they would be expected to generate more 
innovative activity. 
Since radical innovation generates more value than incremental innovation, 
some scholars have assumed, and even developed elaborate theoretical models to 
explain why, large firms, which have large R&D departments, will generate more 
radical innovations than small and new firms, which are constrained by size in their 
ability to invest in R&D (Cohen and Klepper, 1992a, b). 
Five factors favouring the innovative advantage of large enterprises have 
been identified in the literature. First is the argument that innovative activity 
requires a high fixed cost. As Comanor (1967) observes, R&D typically involves a 
“lumpy” process that yields scale economies. Similarly, Galbraith (1956, p. 87) 
argues, “Because development is costly, it follows that it can be carried on only by 
a firm that has the resources which are associated with considerable size.” 
 121
Second, only firms that are large enough to attain at least temporary market 
power will choose innovation as a means for maximization (Kamien and Schwartz, 
1975). This is because the ability of firms to appropriate the economic returns 
accruing from R&D and other knowledge-generating investments is directly related 
to the extent of that enterprise’s market power (Levin et al., 1985, 1987; Cohen et 
al., 1987; Cohen and Klepper, 1991). 
Third, R&D is a risky investment; small firms engaging in R&D make 
themselves vulnerable by investing a large proportion of their resources in a single 
project. However, their larger counterparts can reduce the risk accompanying 
innovation through diversification into simultaneous research projects. The larger 
firm is also more likely to find an economic application for the uncertain outcomes 
resulting from innovative activity (Nelson, 1959). 
Fourth, scale economies in production may also provide scope economies 
for R&D. Scherer (1991) notes that economies of scale in promotion and 
distribution facilitate penetration of new products, enabling larger firms to enjoy 
greater profit potential from innovation. Finally, an innovation yielding cost 
reductions of a given percentage results in higher profit margins for larger firms 
than for smaller firms. 
There is also substantial evidence that technological change, or rather one 
aspect of technological change, R&D, is, in fact, positively related to firm size. The 
abundance of empirical studies relating R&D to firm size is thoroughly reviewed in 
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Acs and Audretsch (2003). The empirical evidence is generally consistent with the 
hypothesis that large firms invest in proportionately more R&D. 
Using a direct measure of innovative output from the U.S. Small Business 
Administration’s innovation data base, Acs and Audretsch (1990) and Pavitt et al. 
(1987), in a similar study for the U.K., show that the most innovative U.S. firms are 
large corporations. Furthermore, the most innovative American corporations also 
tend to have large R&D laboratories and be R&D intensive. At first glance, these 
findings, based on direct measures of innovative activity, seem to confirm the 
conventional wisdom. However, in the most innovative four-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC) industries, large firms, defined as enterprises with at 
least 500 employees, contributed more innovations in some instances, while in other 
industries small firms produced more innovations. For example, in the area of 
computers and process control instruments, small firms contributed the bulk of 
innovations. By contrast, in the area of pharmaceutical preparation and aircraft 
industries, large firms were much more innovative. 
Probably the best measure of innovative activity is the total innovation rate, 
which is defined as the total number of innovations per thousand employees in each 
industry. The innovation rate for large firms is defined as the number of innovations 
made by firms with at least 500 employees divided by the number of employees 
(thousands) in large firms. Similarly, the innovation rate for small firms is defined 
as the number of innovations made by firms with fewer than 500 employees divided 
by the number of employees (thousands) in small firms. 
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Innovation rates, or the number of innovations per thousand employees, 
have the advantage that they measure innovative activity in large and small firms 
relative to the presence of large and small firms in any given industry. Thus, for 
example, while large firms in manufacturing introduced 2445 innovations and small 
firms contributed slightly fewer (1954), employment in small firms was only half 
that in large firms, yielding an average innovation rate in manufacturing of 0.309 
for small firms compared with an average innovation rate of 0.202 for large firms 
(Acs and Audretsch, 1988, 1990). 
What explains this innovation paradox, where small and new firms are 
empirically found to generate more innovative activity than would be expected 
given their meagre R&D resources? Resolution of this paradox lies again in 
considering both the nature of knowledge within the context of the organizations 
creating that knowledge and the role of entrepreneurship, or what Audretsch et al. 
(2006) term the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship. 
Because of the conditions inherent in radical innovation based on knowledge 
― high uncertainty, asymmetries and transactions cost ― decision-making 
hierarchies can reach the decision not to commercialize new ideas that individual 
economic agents, or groups of economic agents, think are potentially valuable and 
should be pursued. The characteristics of knowledge that distinguish it from 
information ― a high degree of uncertainty combined with non-trivial asymmetries, 
combined with a broad spectrum of institutions, rules and regulations ― distinguish 
radical innovation from incremental innovation. 
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Thus, not all potential innovative activity, especially radical innovations 
created through scientific discoveries and inventions, is fully appropriated within 
the firm making investments to create that knowledge in the first place. Various 
constraints on the ability of a large firm to determine the value of knowledge 
prevent it from fully exploiting the inherent value of its knowledge assets (Moran 
and Ghoshal, 1999). In fact, evidence suggests that many large, established 
companies find it difficult to take advantage of all the opportunities emanating from 
their investment in scientific knowledge (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). For 
example, Xerox’s Palo Alto research centre succeeded in generating a large number 
of scientific breakthroughs (a superior personal computer, the facsimile machine, 
the Ethernet and the laser printer, among others), yet failed to commercialize many 
of them and develop them into innovations (Smith and Alexander, 1988; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). 
The knowledge conditions inherent in radical innovation impose what 
Audretsch et al. (2006) and Acs et al. (2004) term the knowledge filter. The 
knowledge filter is the gap between knowledge that has potential commercial value 
and knowledge that is actually commercialized in the form of innovative activity. 
The greater the knowledge filter, the more pronounced the gap between new 
knowledge and commercialized knowledge in the form of innovative activity.  
An example of the knowledge filter confronting a large firm is provided by 
the response of IBM to Bill Gates, who approached IBM to see if it was interested 
in purchasing the then struggling Microsoft. They weren’t interested. IBM turned 
down, “the chance to buy ten percent of Microsoft for a song in 1986, a missed 
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opportunity that would cost $3 billion today.”21 IBM reached its decision on the 
grounds that “neither Gates nor any of his band of thirty some employees had 
anything approaching the credentials or personal characteristics required to work at 
IBM.”22  
Thus, the knowledge filter serves as a barrier impeding investments in new 
knowledge from being pursued and developed to generate innovative activity. In 
some cases, a firm will decide against developing and commercializing new ideas 
emanating from its knowledge investments even if an employee, or group of 
employees, think they have a positive expected value. As explained above, this 
divergence arises because of the inherent conditions of uncertainty, asymmetries 
and high transactions costs which create the knowledge filter.  
While Griliches’ model of the knowledge production function focuses on the 
decision-making context of the firm concerning investments in new knowledge, 
Audretsch (1995) proposed shifting the unit of analysis from the firm to the 
individual knowledge worker (or group of knowledge workers). This shifted the 
fundamental decision-making unit of observation in the model of the knowledge 
production function away from exogenously assumed firms to individuals, such as 
scientists, engineers or other knowledge workers ― agents with endowments of 
new economic knowledge. Shifting the focus away from the firm to the individual 
as the relevant unit of observation also shifts the appropriation problem to the 
individual, so that the relevant question becomes how economic agents with a given 
                                                 
21 “System Error,” The Economist, September 18, 1993, p. 99. 
22 Paul Carrol, “Die Offene Schlacht,” Die Zeit, No. 39, September 1993, p.18. 
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endowment of new knowledge can best appropriate the returns from that 
knowledge. If an employee can pursue a new idea within the context of the 
organizational structure of the incumbent firm, there is no reason to leave the firm. 
If, on the other hand, employees place greater value on their ideas than the decision-
making hierarchy of the incumbent firm, they may face forgoing what has been 
determined to be a good idea. Such divergences in the valuation of new ideas force 
workers to choose between forgoing ideas or starting a new firm to appropriate the 
value of their knowledge.  
By focusing on the decision-making context confronting the individual, the 
knowledge production function is actually reversed. Knowledge becomes 
exogenous and embodied in a worker. The firm is created endogenously in the 
workers’ efforts to appropriate the value of their knowledge through innovative 
activity. Typically, an employee in an incumbent large corporation, often a scientist 
or engineer working in a research laboratory, will have an idea for an invention and 
ultimately for an innovation. Accompanying this potential innovation is an expected 
net return from the new product. The inventor would expect compensation for the 
potential innovation accordingly. If the company has a different, presumably lower, 
valuation of the potential innovation, it may decide either not to pursue its 
development or that it merits a lower level of compensation than that expected by 
the employee. 
In either case, employees will weigh the alternative of starting their own 
firm. If the gap in the expected return accruing from the potential innovation 
between the inventor and the corporate decision maker is sufficiently large, and if 
 127
the cost of starting a new firm is sufficiently low, the employee may decide to leave 
the large corporation and establish a new enterprise. Since the knowledge was 
generated in the established corporation, the new start-up is considered to be a 
spinoff from the existing firm. Such start-ups typically do not have direct access to 
a large R&D laboratory. Rather, the entrepreneurial opportunity emanates from the 
knowledge and experience accrued from the R&D laboratories of the previous 
employer. Thus, entrepreneurship is an endogenous response to opportunities 
created by investments in new knowledge that are not commercialized because of 
the knowledge filter. By resorting to starting up a new firm to actualize the 
commercialization of ideas that otherwise might remain dormant in the incumbent 
firm, entrepreneurship serves as a conduit for knowledge spillovers. 
Knowledge created in one organizational context that remains 
uncommercialized due to the knowledge filter provides an important source of new 
entrepreneurial opportunities. It is new knowledge and ideas created in one context 
but left uncommercialized or not vigorously pursued by the organization actually 
creating those ideas, such as a research laboratory in a large corporation or research 
undertaken by a university, that serves as the source of knowledge generating 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Thus, entrepreneurship can serve as an important 
mechanism facilitating the spillover of knowledge. The incumbent organization 
creating the knowledge and opportunities is not the same firm that actually exploits 
the opportunities. If the exploitation of those opportunities by the entrepreneur does 
not involve full payment to the firm for producing those opportunities, such as a 
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licence or royalty, then the entrepreneurial act of starting a new firm serves as a 
mechanism for knowledge spillovers. 
 Thus, new knowledge generating opportunities for entrepreneurship is the 
duality of the knowledge filter. The higher the knowledge filter, the greater the 
divergence in the valuation of new ideas between economic agents and the 
decision-making hierarchies of incumbent firms. Entrepreneurial opportunities are 
generated not just by investments in new knowledge and ideas, but by the 
propensity for only a distinct subset of those knowledge opportunities to be fully 
pursued and commercialized by incumbent firms. Thus, entrepreneurship is 
important in generating innovative activity in general and radical innovations in 
particular by serving as an important conduit of knowledge spillovers. 
 
6.5 Measuring and Defining Radical Innovation 
6.4.1 Expert Panels 
There is a long tradition of relying on industry experts to identify innovative 
activity. The first serious attempt to directly measure innovative output was made 
by a panel of industry experts assembled by the Gellman Research Associates 
(1976) for the National Science Foundation. The Gellman panel identified 500 
major innovations that were introduced into the market between 1953 and 1973 in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, France and Canada. 
The database was compiled by an international panel of experts who identified 
those innovations representing the “most significant new industrial products and 
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processes, in terms of their technological importance and economic and social 
impact” (National Science Board, 1975, p. 100). 
A second and comparable database once again involved an expert panel 
assembled by the Gellman Research Associates (1982), this time for the U.S. Small 
Business Administration. In their second study, the Gellman panel identified 635 
U.S. innovations, including 45 from the earlier study for the National Science 
Foundation. The remaining 590 innovations were selected from 14 industry trade 
journals for the period 1970–1979. About 43 percent of the sample was selected 
from award-winning innovations described in Industrial Research and Development 
magazine. 
A third data source to directly measure innovation activity was compiled at 
the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of the University of Sussex in the United 
Kingdom.23  The SPRU data consist of a survey of 4378 innovations that were 
identified over a period of 15 years. The survey was compiled by writing to experts 
in each industry and requesting them to identify “significant technical innovations 
that had been successfully commercialized in the United Kingdom since 1945, and 
to name the firm responsible” (Pavitt et al., 1987, p. 299). 
Another study conducted by Acs and Audretsch (1990) looked at 4938 
innovations and their levels of significance (Table 4): (1) the innovation established 
an entirely new category of product, (2) the innovation is the first of its type on the 
market in a product category already in existence, (3) the innovation represents a 
                                                 
5 The SPRU innovation data are explained in detail in Pavitt et al. (1987), 
Townsend et al. (1981), Robson and Townsend (1984) and Rothwell (1989). 
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significant improvement in technology, and (4) the innovation is a modest 
improvement designed to update an existing product (Acs and Audretsch, 1990). 
Table 4 Distribution of Innovations of Large and Small Firms According to their 
Level of Significance (percentages in parentheses) 
Level of 
Significance 
Description Number of Innovations 
  Large Firms Small Firms 
1 Established a 
new product 
category 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
2 First of its 
type on the 
market in an 
existing 
product 
category 
50 (1.76)  30 (1.43) 
3 Significant 
improvement 
in existing 
technology 
360 (12.70)  216 (10.27) 
4 Modest 
improvement 
designed to 
update an 
existing 
product 
2434 (85.53)  1959 (88.31) 
       
Total  2834 (99.99)  2104 (100) 
Source: Audretsch and Acs (1990) 
Acs and Audretsch (1990) found that while none of the innovations were at 
the highest level of significance, they did find that small firms make up a 
considerable portion of the innovations within the field. There appears to be little 
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difference in the “quality” and significance of innovations between large and small 
firms.  
The most recent and ambitious major database providing a direct measure of 
innovative activity is the U.S. Small Business Administration’s Innovation Data 
Base (SBIDB). The database consists of 8074 innovations commercially introduced 
in the U.S. in 1982. A private firm, The Futures Group, compiled the data and 
performed quality-control analyses for the U.S. Small Business Administration by 
examining more than 100 technology, engineering and trade journals spanning 
every industry in manufacturing. Industry experts were relied upon to identify 
innovations as well as their significance. From the sections in each trade journal 
listing innovations and new products, a database consisting of innovations by four-
digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industries was established. Many of the 
innovations were classified according to four distinct levels of significance, ranging 
from incremental, which referred to quality improvement, to most significant, 
which presumably referred to a radical innovation.24    
Dewar and Dutton similarly relied upon an ex post study of experts to 
identify specific radical innovations and suggest that, “the major difference 
captured by the labels radical and incremental is the degree of novel technical 
process content embodied in the innovation and hence, the degree of new 
knowledge embedded in the innovation” (Dewar and Dutton, 1986, p. 1429). This 
distinction is consistent with those researchers who define technology in terms of its 
                                                 
6 A detailed description of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s Innovation 
Data Base can be found in Chapter 2 of Acs and Audretsch (1990). 
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knowledge component (Dutton and Thomas, 1985). Although radical and 
incremental pertain to distinctions along a theoretical continuum of the level of new 
knowledge embedded in an innovation, the middle values of this continuum are 
difficult to interpret (Baumol 2004). 
Another expert panel study found that there are large discrepancies between 
innovations by small and large firms among U.S. and non-U.S. companies. As 
shown by Chandy and Tellis (2000) in Figure 1, only 45 percent of non-U.S. small 
firms created radical innovations, while 66 percent of U.S. small firms created 
radical innovations.  
Figure 1: Share of Radical Innovations by Firm Size and Country for Consumer 
Durables and Office Products 
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Source: Chandy and Tellis (2000) 
6.4.2 S-Curves and Technological Trajectories 
Dosi (1982) enters the theoretical discussion by describing how 
discontinuous and continuous technological trajectories can be distinguished. Much 
of the foundation for this area of research uses Schumpeterian economic evolution 
to understand the innovation process. In particular, Dosi develops a framework for 
distinguishing radical innovation from incremental innovation based on the 
technological push and consumer demand for innovation. Dosi suggests that an 
incremental innovation extends an existing technological paradigm. By contrast, a 
radical innovation creates a new technological paradigm. According to Dosi (1982, 
p. 150), “Technological paradigms have a powerful exclusion effect: the efforts and 
the technological imagination of engineers and the organizations they are in are 
focuses in rather precise direction while they are, so to speak, ‘blind’ with respect to 
other technological possibilities. At the same time, technological paradigms define 
also some idea of ‘progress’.” As shown in Figure 2, there are two points of 
innovation.  
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Figure 2: S-Curve of Radical Innovation 
Source: Chandy and Tellis (2000, p. 3) 
At point A, there is a technological breakthrough. This breakthrough allows 
the firm to properly estimate how and when it may introduce the innovation to the 
market. This new technology over time succeeds the existing technology. Once the 
technological breakthrough enters (point B) into the existing technological curve, it 
provides greater value added and supersedes the existing technology.   
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As Dahlin and Bohrens (2004) rightly point out: “A related approach 
suggests that the development of technologies subsequent to the introduction of a 
radical innovation will follow the path of an S-curve. However, as is the case for 
technological trajectories, S-curves do not offer a precise manner for mapping 
technologies. Neither do they help us identify, or define, the radical invention that 
will start a new S-curve. In effect, whereas one needs to have good ideas about what 
the important performance criteria are a priori, such ideas appear to us only a 
fortiori in Dosi and Foster’s framework analyzing radical innovations.” 
6.4.3 Hedonic Price Models 
This strand of literature stems from Henderson and Clark (1990) and 
Henderson (1993), where price is the empirical measure used to determine radical 
innovation. Henderson studies the lithographic industry. While hedonic pricing 
traditionally limits itself to technological fields, it provides a quantifiable means to 
understand the impact of variables on price. For example, instead of just comparing 
the price of a black-box camera with a digital camera, the model would adjust for 
incremental improvements in the process, such as a flash or quicker shutter speed. 
Therefore, it provides a simple way to understand how supplementary additions in 
the quality of a product affect price. Henderson (1993, p. 258) finds that “prior 
experience is significantly and negatively correlated with realized market share for 
radical innovation, providing strong support for the hypothesis that incumbents 
attempting to introduce products that require quite different organizational 
capabilities were severely handicapped.”  
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There are multiple problems with this method. The most crucial problem is 
that the method is unable to test for new fields that are dormant or in an emerging 
field. Indeed, 15 years prior to her study, the radical innovation of the digital 
camera was already owned and operated by the Kodak Eastman Company.25  Other 
problems with the method, for example, are that the hedonic price index approach 
incorporates the productivity of individuals, and multiple product levels can be 
tested. However, one must pre-select what product characteristics might predict the 
degree to which an innovation is radical. Another problem is that the willingness to 
pay may be more likely with incremental changes (Tellis and Golder, 1996; Shane, 
2001).  
6.4.4 Codified Innovation: Patents 
Over the past 20 years, patents have become one of the most common means 
of measuring the degree to which an innovation is radical or incremental. Patents 
have become an important metric in the innovation literature because of an easy and 
open paper trail of patent citations. This trail leaves a clearly defined origin of ideas 
and represents a clear lineage of where ideas go when they are cited in the future. 
This lineage comes in two forms: forward citations and backward citations. Patent 
citations also indicate a clear economic value to start-ups and economic growth 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). Since patent citations are equitable to a patent monopoly, there 
are strict procedures to ensure that appropriate citations are issued, creating a 
platform for researchers to apply empirical investigation for radical innovation. 
                                                 
 
 
 137
 
6.4.5 Forward Patent Citation Radicalness 
Forward patent citation involves future citations of a patent. These citations 
come from United States patent examiners. These professionals cite the previous 
patent only when there is a legitimate reason to cite the previous patent’s 
intellectual property. These future citations are called forward patent citations. 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) measure the degree of radicalness by examining the 
computer disk industry to investigate the impact patents have on future citations in 
domains of patent classification. Patent domains are maintained and categorized by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The authors’ show how 
incremental patents are often more narrowly cited within a certain domain of 
patents and radical patents are often cited by multiple domains of patents. 
The forward patent count that Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) use is, in many 
ways, comparable to forward citations in scholarly journals. There are, however, 
two detrimental differences when using citations. First, there is a motivation from 
the patent inventor to cite as little as possible from previous work. The less work 
that is cited in the grant application, the more intellectual property (IP) monopoly is 
granted to the inventor. Second, a patent examiner is required to assign relevant 
patent citations to the patent application. For a greater understanding of deficiencies 
in the U.S. patent-examining process, see Graham and Harhoff (2006) and Harhoff 
et al. (2002). Drawing on patent citations creates other problems as well. As 
Rosenberg and Nekar (2001, p. 290) define radical innovation: “‘radical’ 
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exploration builds upon distant technology that resides outside of the firm. The 
technological subunit utilizes knowledge from a different technological domain and 
does not obtain that knowledge from other subunits with the firm.”  
The definition of radicalness holds innovation exogenous to the human capital 
and tacit knowledge of the firm. As Klepper and Graddy (1990) suggest, new and 
radical innovations can come from subunits within the firm. The distant technology 
can often be found within the incumbent firm. However, the firm is unwilling to 
either operationalize the potential radical innovation due to managerial 
disagreements or commit resources to a new and uncertain venture. 
6.4.6 Backward Patent Classification and Citations 
Backward patent citations are citations given to prior work. These citations are 
issued by patent examiners where examiners cite previous patents, thereby giving 
the citations a clear line of intellectual property rights. Shane (2001) shows, through 
a unique data set from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) inventors 
involving 1397 licensed MIT patents, that the more radical the invention, the more 
likely it was made by a small firm. As Shane (2001, p. 208) explains, radical 
innovations will tend to originate from small firms and large firms: “First, radical 
technologies destroy the capabilities of existing firms because they draw on new 
technical skills. Since organizational capabilities are difficult and costly to create 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Feeman, 1984), established firms are 
organized to exploit established technologies. Firms find it difficult to change their 
activities to exploit technologies based on different technical skills.” Shane (2001) 
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finds that research suggests that radical patent citations and a lack of patent 
classification are positive to start-ups for the MIT-based patents. As one may note 
from Table 5, Shane’s method of radical identification is one of many ways to 
identify radical innovations. 
Table 5: Literature Summary of Radical Innovations 
Commonly used definitions of radical versus incremental changes  
Studies in chronological 
order  Industries studied  Definition of novelty  
Cooper and Schendel 
(1976)  
 
None. Selected industries in which almost 
full substitution occurred when innovation 
was introduced  
 
Locomotives, fountain pens, 
vacuum tubes, fossil fuel boilers, 
safety razors, propellers, leather   
   
Dosi (1982)  Theory paper  
  
  
Technological paradigm = “model” and a 
“pattern” of solution of selected 
technological problems, based on  
selected principles derived from natural 
sciences and on selected material 
technologies (p. 152); radical change; 
paradigm shift 
   
Foster (1985)  Multiple examples, e.g., watches, 
artificial hearts, textile fibres, 
semiconductors  
Discontinuity = gap between two S-curves 
at a point where one technology replaces 
another  
   
Dewar and Dutton (1986)  Shoe manufacturing  
  
Radical innovations require adopting firm to 
process new information  
   
Anderson and Tushman 
(1990)  
Glass, cement and 
minicomputers  
  
  
Two dimensions: (1) order-of-magnitude 
change in price-performance ratio; (2) 
competence-enhancing versus competence-
destroying  
   
Henderson and Clark 
(1990)  
Theory paper  
  
  
Two dimensions: (1) design architecture is 
reinforced or changed; (2) core 
technological concepts in componentry are 
reinforced or changed  
   
Henderson (1993)  Photolithographic alignment 
equipment  
  
Two dimensions: (1) degree of 
substitutability; (2) competence-enhancing 
versus competence-destroying  
   
Das (1994)  Theory paper  
  
Two dimensions: (1) knowledge same or 
different; (2) competence-enhancing versus 
competence-destroying  
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Christensen and 
Rosenbloom (1995)  
Disk drives  
  
Radical = launching new direction in 
technology versus Incremental = making 
progress along established path  
   
Christensen and Bower 
(1996)  
Disk drives  
  
Radical = disrupts or redefines a 
performance trajectory 
Incremental = sustains the industry’s rate of 
improvement in product performance 
    
Tripsas (1997)  Graphical typesetting  None  
   
Chandy and Tellis (2000) Consumer durables and office 
products 
“a new product that incorporates a 
substantially different core technology and 
provides substantially higher customer 
benefits relative to previous products in the 
industry” (p. 2) 
 
   
Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
(2001)  
Optical disk technology  “Radical exploration builds upon distant 
technology that resides outside of the firm.” 
(p. 290) 
   
   
Shane (2001) MIT-licensed patents “I measure the radicalness of the patent as a 
time-invariant count of the number of three-
digit patent classes in which previous 
patents cited by the given patent are found, 
but the patent is not classified” (p. 210) 
   
Ahuja and Lampert (2001)  Chemicals  
  
Radical/breakthrough inventions “serve as 
the basis of ‘future’ technologies, products 
and services.” (p. 522)  
   
Dahlin and Behrens (2005) Tennis racquets 
  
Three criteria: (1) the invention must be 
novel: it needs to be dissimilar from prior 
inventions; (2) the invention must be 
unique: it needs to be dissimilar from 
current inventions; (3) the invention must be 
adopted: it needs to influence the content of 
future inventions 
 
Adapted from Dahlin and Behrens (2005) 
6.4.6 Dahlin and Behrens Metric for Radical Innovations 
As one can see, radical innovations come in multiple paths and trajectories. 
Whether through small or large firms, these innovations are able to transform the 
nature of the market to the advantage of the radically innovative firm. The best 
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method to identify an ex ante radical innovation, therefore, is through the only 
available paper trail of patents. As mentioned earlier, analysis has used either 
forward patent or backward patent citations, but has never used both to dynamically 
analyze the data. Dahlin and Behrens (2005) use patents from the tennis racquet 
industry to show that there is not only a way to ex ante identify whether an 
invention is radical, but also a way to systematically analyze a product market to 
determine whether the innovation is radical.  
Dahlin and Behrens offer an attractive means to identify incipient radical 
innovations a priori, or before they are actually fully developed and introduced. 
They create a three-stage metric process that distinguishes between radical 
invention and radical innovation. This is an important process. As mentioned in 
previous sections, other methods were unable to identify radical inventions and 
therefore the potential radical innovation in the pipeline. As mentioned above, for 
example, innovations from large firms, such as the Kodak digital camera, were not 
recognized as radical inventions due to a lack of proper identification metrics. This 
method offers a needed predictive power of identifying patents that have the 
potential to be radical innovations. The model offers three criteria and is based on 
the structure of patent citations and replication of new patent citations.  
The Dahlin and Behrens model identifies radical inventions as inventions 
that heavily influence and affect the future content of patent families. Therefore, the 
patent must be unique to other patents in terms of its patent structure and future 
citations. This uniqueness is identified by the criteria presented in Table 5. 
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Dahlin and Behrens’ model places emphasis on how dissimilar the patent is 
to past and current inventions. Therefore, when new patents are filed, the new 
patents’ citations are compared with the identified radical invention. If the new 
patents replicate a similar patent structure to the identified radical patent, the radical 
patent is then classified as a radical innovation. In Table 6, the advantages of using 
the Dahlin-Behrens model are examined.  
 
Table 6: Characterizing Each Definitional Form of Radical Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 S-Curves  Hedonic Price Models  Expert Panels  Patent Measures  
 
 
Dahlin-Berhens 
Practical problems        
1. Lacks quantifiable 
measurement 
indicating when an 
invention is radical  
  
  
  
Yes — need expert help  
to determine if a new 
trajectory/curve is started 
 
Yes — focuses on price  
increases as a function of  
technical criteria, but any 
price increase counts 
 
No —  uses scales of  
expert perceptions  
No — but cut-off  
points often 
arbitrary and not 
defined a priori 
  
No — uses patent 
citations 
2. Difficulty of 
timing — when to  
compare innovations  
  
No — assumes multiple 
time comparisons 
No — allows for multiple 
time comparisons  
 
Yes — focuses on  
experts at one point in  
time  
Yes — for forward  
citations; no — for  
backward citations  
No — analyzes both 
past and 
currentinnovation 
structure 
3. Difficulty in 
accessing data  
Difficult  Medium difficulty  Easy  Easy  No — data are freely 
accessible 
4. A priori key 
characteristic  
determined?  
  
Yes — model is  
predefined as effort  
and technical impact  
No — models are variable 
 
No — varies from  
expert to expert  
Yes — patent 
citations  
  
  
Yes ― patent citations 
Conceptual 
problems  
      
1. Performance-
comparison issues  
  
  
  
Allows for continuous  
comparisons over time 
since multiple  
trajectories/curves  
Medium, easy to test  
multiple criteria  
simultaneously  
Depends on  
questionnaire  
Yes — for forward  
citations, mainly  
timing issues  
  
No — one may track 
the performance of 
the citations 
2. Impact-based 
definition  
  
  
  
  
  
No  Yes — if no effect on  
demand (price higher), 
not considered radical 
 
Standard questions  
have impact bias,  
could be removed  
Yes — for forward  
citations; no — for  
backward citations  
  
  
  
No — impact is based 
on citations and noton 
actual commercial 
output 
3. Assumptions of 
firm homogeneity  
  
  
  
  
  
No  No — focus on product  
characteristics  
Standard questions  
have impact bias,  
could be removed  
Yes — for forward  
citations, ignoring 
the likelihood 
ofbeing cited is 
afunction of firm 
status; no — for 
backwardscitations  
Yes — for forward  
citations, ignoring the  
likelihood of being  
cited is a function of  
firm status; no — for  
backwards citations  
4. Selection bias  
  
  
  
  
Depends on data source 
and how trajectories/curves 
are identified 
  
Yes — only  
characteristics in products 
with market success will  
be included 
 
Yes — recency and  
success biases also  
likely  
  
No  
  
  
  
  
No 
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6.5. Conclusions 
 
  
 In this chapter, we offer a literature review of how radical innovation is 
quantified and the metrics applied for identifying radical innovation. As suggested 
in the literature, there are conflicting empirical metrics identifying radical 
innovation. Consequently, there is conflicting empirical evidence on the propensity 
for small and large firms to engage in radical innovation. After all, according to the 
literature, it surely cannot be that both large firms are “incompetent” and small 
firms are “inferior” with respect to radical innovations. These empirical 
inconsistencies lie, to some degree, in how one identifies a radical invention.  
While not perfect, the Dahlin-Behrens model provides policy-makers with 
an easily accessible and identifiable means to properly identify radical innovations 
ex ante. This identification requires that the radical innovation 1) be dissimilar to 
previous patent citations, 2) differ from existing patent citations, and 3) affect future 
patent citation structures. The three-stage definition offers explicit advantages over 
previous identification regimes. Specifically, technical content is identified and 
tracked over time. The definition also eliminates many of the problems found in 
other identification metrics, such as 1) definition and measurement, 2) ability to 
identify an invention that is still in the development phase, and 3) identification is 
not measured by ex post analysis. 
 While it will continue to be unclear what share of radical innovation 
originates from small and large firms, the ability to identify the invention will be the 
critical aspect for policy-makers and then to identify whether the invention is from a 
large or small firm. Therefore, the authors believe that radical innovation should not 
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necessarily be analyzed under the large or small firm unit of analysis, but rather 
radical innovations should be identified and tracked within and coming out of the 
pipeline. 
 
 
Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
A result of globalization and investment in knowledge has led countries to 
shift their comparative advantage away from traditional industries such as 
manufacturing and large scale firm production towards new territories of 
knowledge-based economic activity. But how and where will policy makers turn for 
new forms of knowledge-based activity? While the overall answers remains 
clouded, one area where policy makers will be turning their heads is toward 
university knowledge and scientist entrepreneurship.  
As research and knowledge become perhaps the most crucial component to 
generating economic growth and competitive jobs in globally-linked markets, 
universities emerge as a key factor in determining the future well-being of the 
country. After all, it ranks among the most important tasks of universities to create 
new scientific knowledge. In addition, the magnitude of resources being invested in 
university research, including some of the most capable and creative scientists in the 
country, is the envy of the world. 
The massive investment in university research can impact economic growth 
only if knowledge can be transformed into actual innovations and new and better 
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products through the commercialization process. That is, the extent to which 
university research becomes commercialized. It matters for economic growth, for 
jobs and for global competitiveness. 
This book has taken a different approach towards addressing where 
knowledge-based entrepreneurship may manifest itself. Rather than focus on what 
the TTOs do, it instead focuses on what university scientists do. Thus, the findings 
about the commercialization of university research are based on actual university 
scientists and not the TTOs. The results are revealing. In particular, while all modes 
of commercialization are important, scientist entrepreneurship emerges as an 
important and prevalent mode of commercialization of university research. More than 
one in four patenting NCI scientists has started a new firm. This is a remarkably high 
rate of entrepreneurship for any group of people, let alone university scientists. Thus, 
the extent to which university research is being commercialized and entering the 
market may be significantly greater than might have been inferred from studies 
restricted only to the commercialization activities of the TTO. Scientist 
entrepreneurship may prove to be the sleeping giant of university commercialization. 
7.2 Future research 
There are three primary areas of future research. The first area needs to 
further probe why and how scientists choose to commercialize their research, what 
commercialization route they select, what mode of commercialization is most 
effective, and how university governance and public policy can best promote such 
commercialization efforts. A host of pressing questions remains. For example, are all 
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social networks equivalent, that is are they homogeneous, or do some facilitate 
scientist commercialization more than others? Similarly, do non-patenting scientists 
engage in commercialization activities, particularly entrepreneurship, or does their 
lack of patented intellectual propensity preclude commercialization of their research? 
Whatever answers to these and other crucial questions future research can uncover 
will be highly important. 
Another stream of research will require similar studies in other fields of 
technology. While Oncology research is a critical area for commercialization, it 
remains to be seen whether other fields of knowledge share similar variables for 
entrepreneurship and economic growth. Indeed, given that Oncology has a relatively 
development field, other fields such as Green Technology may have a very different 
fate for commercialization.  
The third area of future research is to fully understand how managing 
intellectual property (IP) at universities may be optimized. As noted in chapter three, 
there are several routes to commercialize knowledge, but most IP is, at least in the 
initial stage, channeled through the TTO. Given that the TTOs primary objective is to 
maximize revenue through licensing, there could very well be some form of loss to 
growth by not allowing scientists to startup on their own invented patent technology. 
This loss may also ferment what is called the backdoor approach to patenting where 
scientists do not register their IP with the TTO, furthering the problem of accurately 
estimating to true rate of return on public R&D. The questions will further help 
policy makers understand how important knowledge-based scientist entrepreneurship 
are to regions and economic growth. Whatever the answers may be, it is well worth 
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noting that scientist entrepreneurship will continue to be an increasingly important 
field of research for economics and public policy.  
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